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INTRODUCTION
In a series of writings over his career, Professor Peter
Westen has subjected important legal and moral concepts
to rigorous exegesis and critique. Equality,1
unconstitutional conditions,2 waiver and forfeiture,3 and
duress4 are just some of the objects of his penetrating
analysis. Now he has turned his gaze to consent.
The idea of consent is pervasive, in ordinary language,
in morality, in law. In the criminal law, and especially the
criminal law of rape and sexual assault, conceptual and
normative disputes about how consent should be
understood are both common and difficult to resolve,
inevitably resulting in intractable factual disputes about
whether consent exists in a given case. The task of
Westen's book is to show that conceptual confusion about
the meaning of consent is rampant, and that conceptual
clarity would permit a sharper focus on the significant
issues about which we really disagree. In this task, he
succeeds admirably.
In a comprehensive, wide-ranging exploration of legal
doctrine and policy, Westen demonstrates beyond cavil that
legislators and commentators frequently confuse different
senses of consent, or use the term inconsistently. He also
1. Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of
"Equality" in Moral and Legal Discourse (1990); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). Responses to Westen's critique of the use of
equality arguments include Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 Col. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As a
Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387 (1985); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of
Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 693 (2000).
2. Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. Rev. 977
(1985); Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 Duke L.J. 541.
3. Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional
Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 741 (1981); Peter Weston,
Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214 (1977).
4. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A
Justification, Not an Excuse-And Why It Matters, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 833
(2003).
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reveals the variety of legislative approaches to consent.
Some explicitly define it as a subjective mental state,
others as an objective expression of an acquiescing state of
mind, and still others leave the matter obscure.
In response to this pervasive confusion, Westen
provides his own highly illuminating framework. The book
displays many virtues: originality, subtlety, honesty, a
willingness to question received wisdom. It is sprinkled
with vivid examples, drawn from a remarkable range of
sources: case law and psychological case studies, fairy tales
and film, not to mention fanciful philosophical thought
experiments. These illustrations enliven a painstaking
analysis that could otherwise be forbiddingly dry. The
doctrinal exploration, too, is impressively wide. A range of
different statutory approaches are examined, encompassing
the laws of many different states and of European nations
as well.
I do have some significant reservations about Westen's
framework, and I believe that some of his specific
arguments are incomplete or unsound. But I have no doubt
that his analysis will be a necessary point of departure for
any serious future scholarly inquiry into the concept of
consent in criminal law.
This review is organized as follows. After a brief
exegesis of his overall framework, I proceed to a closer
analysis of its various elements. A later section addresses
his controversial claim that both "force" requirements and
"resistance" requirements are essentially gratuitous. A
conclusion follows.
I. BRIEF EXEGESIS OF THE FRAMEWORK
The following chart summarizes the framework that
Westen recommends for analyzing problems of consent to
sexual relations.
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Factual consent
[or "actual" consent']
Factual attitudinal consent (FAC) "Factual "expressive" consent (FEC)
(unconditional preference, conditional (A's interpretive community understands S's
preference among available alternatives, or words and conduct to satisfy FAC)
"indifference")
Legal consent
[or legally binding consent]
Prescriptive consent Imputed consent
(legal fictions of consent)
Prescriptive Prescriptive Constructive "Informed" Hypothetical
attitudinal expressive consent consent consent
consent consent (S does not (S consents to (S would have
(requires FAC (requires FEC consent to x but a risk of x consented if she
and additional and additional voluntarily rather than to had been capable
conditions of conditions of participates in a x itself) of doing so at the
competence, competence, social practice that time)
etc.) etc.) includes x)
In simplified terms, and disregarding for now some of
Westen's careful qualifications, the categories are used as
follows. A person S gives factual consent to sexual relations
with A if she chooses that option as what she most prefers
under the circumstances. Thus, factual consent comprises
not only S's eager, active response to A's initiative, but also
her reluctant and passive submission to his advances. And
unenthusiastic acquiescence counts as factual consent not
only when the reluctance stems from milder forms of
pressure such as fear that A will otherwise be in a foul
mood, or will break off the relationship, but also when it
5. In a recent article, Westen restates some central themes from his book.
Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions about Consent in Rape Cases, 2 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 333 (2004). In the article, unlike the book, he employs "actual"
consent as an important category. Unfortunately, its scope is uncertain. He seems
to use "actual" consent to describe factual, empirical consent, see id. at 349, but
elsewhere he contrasts "actual" consent with "imputed" consent, thus apparently
using the category to encompass all forms of non-imputed consent, both factual
and prescriptive consent. See id. at 337.
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stems from a threat of serious violence if she fails to
submit. Needless to say, factual consent is not a sufficient
condition of legally valid consent that will preclude
criminal liability, since every jurisdiction prohibits
acquiescence induced by threats of violence. But it is,
Westen contends, ordinarily a necessary condition.
Factual attitudinal consent (FAC) occurs when S
subjectively agrees to sexual relations, while factual
expressive consent (FEC) occurs when S expresses FAC-
by, for example, verbally agreeing to have sex, or engaging
in other types of conduct by which she objectively expresses
her positive desire or acquiescence. But again, neither of
these two forms of factual consent is sufficient for legal
consent.
The concept of prescriptive consent identifies those
instances of factual consent (whether attitudinal consent or
factual expressive consent) that do constitute legally
binding consent. For example, a fourteen-year-old girl who
eagerly engages in sex with an adult gives both attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent, but she doesn't
prescriptively consent, because states require additional
conditions before factual consent is deemed legally valid,
including the condition of being of sufficient age and
maturity to be competent. And competence, along with
freedom and knowledge, is a basic condition of legal
consent. Similarly, a woman who agrees to have sex (and
thus factually consents) only to avoid A's threat of serious
injury does not satisfy a critical condition of freedom-
freedom from violent threats in deciding whether to engage
in sexual relations-required to convert factual into legal
consent. And a woman who is defrauded by a man
impersonating her husband into believing that she is
having intercourse with her husband might fail to satisfy
the condition of sufficient knowledge.
Prescriptive consent is divided into two categories,
depending on whether it incorporates as a necessary
element factual attitudinal or factual expressive consent.
Thus, if a jurisdiction makes legally valid consent depend
on whether a woman actually subjectively chose sex as the
20061
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best option under the circumstances, it is employing the
concept of prescriptive attitudinal consent. If instead it
makes consent depend on whether a woman gave outward
expression to her subjective preference, it is employing the
concept of prescriptive expressive consent.
Finally, Westen identifies three categories of consent
that he considers "fictional," in the sense that legally valid
consent is imputed to S even though she fails to satisfy the
standards of prescriptive consent that, for Westen, are the
only genuine conception of consent. The first such category
is constructive consent-a rule of law to the effect that
voluntary participation in a social practice in which x
occurs is treated as legal consent to x. In this category falls
the traditional marital exemption from rape, which deemed
a married woman to consent to acts of violence by her
husband, even if she did not satisfy the criteria for consent
that would have applied had she not been married to him.
A second category Westen denominates "informed consent,"
or what is more commonly described as assumption of risk.
Here, S does not give either factual or prescriptive consent
to the conduct x that would otherwise be criminal (sexual
relations or a physical contact), but instead merely
consents to the risk of x. (A professional hockey player does
not choose to be pummeled when a fight breaks out, but he
might legally consent to the risk of such a contact or
injury.) The third category, hypothetical consent, is
counterfactual: it deems S to consent, even though she did
not actually do so (in the sense of either attitudinal consent
or "expressive" consent), if S would have consented had she
been capable of doing so at the time. (An unconscious
patient might be deemed to consent to emergency medical
treatment under this standard.)
II. CLOSER ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS
It is worth taking a closer look at the details of
Westen's arguments for the framework, both to see its
value and to identify some problems with his account.
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A. Factual Attitudinal Consent
Westen's account of factual consent is initially
counterintuitive. For he counts as instances of factual
consent decisions by victims of terror and violence to
submit to sex rather than risk suffering future physical
harm, even death. To be sure, he does distinguish
"compulsion," by which he means A's use of physical force
to overwhelm S. (I will note some problems with
"compulsion" below.) And, of course, his categorization of
this scenario as "consensual" is heavily qualified: the
jurisdiction might (and indeed, every jurisdiction does)
further provide that mere factual consent of this sort is
insufficient for legally valid consent. Still, one might
wonder why he dignifies with the label "consent" a decision
by a victim of threatened violence to acquiesce to the
coercer's demands.
But this classification is not as absurd as it might first
seem. One reason why Westen employs the factual consent
category is this: it usefully reminds us that S might be
subject to any of a broad range of pressures on choice, only
some of which are illegitimate and vitiate consent. That is,
one can easily fall into the mistake of thinking that legally
valid consent to x requires that S eagerly embrace x as that
which she desires or chooses in an unqualified way, i.e.,
that which she would also desire or choose if she believed
she was facing a different and more favorable set of
options. But this view is too narrow, Westen emphasizes,
for it would entail that a woman does not legally consent to
sex if she chooses it only because she prefers this to her
partner breaking up with her, or even if she merely prefers
this to waiting until later in the evening and thereby
temporarily disappointing her partner. (For in each case,
she does not obtain what she most prefers-the ability to
decline intercourse without suffering the loss of the
relationship, or the ability to decline intercourse at a
particular time without suffering the emotional harm of
upsetting her partner.) Even if a jurisdiction chooses to
embrace such a stringent standard for valid consent, no
58320061
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jurisdiction currently does so, and Westen wishes to give an
account of consent that makes sense of the full range of
plausible doctrinal approaches. And he is quite right that,
under current law, individuals are very often treated as
legally consenting to sex in the face of certain types of
constraint or pressure even if what they would most prefer
is not to be faced with any negative consequences
whatsoever from their choice.6
A second legitimate reason for employing the factual
consent category is that it accurately describes how people
often employ the term. And since people do use the term
this way, it is important to distinguish quite clearly the
very different meanings of factual and legal consent, so
that legislators, judges, jurors, lawyers, and commentators
do not assume that mere factual consent is legally
sufficient simply because it does, indeed, count as a type of
consent.
Westen gives numerous examples where "consent" is
used in a merely factual sense but is improperly given
undue weight for legal purposes. One famous instance is
the so-called condom case, in which a Texas grand jury
refused to issue a rape indictment even though the
defendant was a stranger who suddenly attacked the victim
with a knife; jurors might have been swayed by the
circumstance that the victim agreed to submit to
intercourse with the defendant if he would wear a condom
(1-2). Such factual consent obviously does not constitute
legal consent, but the grand jury might not have
understood the distinction. Another telling instance is
Blair v. State, a case in which the defense lawyer
successfully confused the jury by falsely implying that
6. As he lucidly explains, the relevant question is not whether the victim
"really wants" to engage in x:
In reality .... a subject S who reluctantly submits to conduct, x, both does
and does not want x. On the one hand, she really wants x, in that she
consciously chooses x for herself under the circumstances, "all things
considered." On the other hand, she really does not want x, in that she
would not choose x if, counterfactually, she were not being subjected to
pressures from which she wishes she were free. (233)
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factual consent is legal consent.7 The lawyer emphasized a
police officer's explicit statement in a police report that the
victim, who said she had been threatened with violence,
"consented" after the defendant said he wanted to have sex.
On the stand, the police officer struggles to explain himself,
agreeing that "consent" was the terminology he used, and
then explaining, "That was, I believe, an error on my part.
'I submitted' would have been the proper word, rather than
'consent.' 8 Westen concludes: "[B]ecause the police officer
realized that the defense counsel was exploiting the
ambiguity to mislead the jury about what he meant, the
officer was forced to repudiate a perfectly sensible use of
'consent' on his part by stating that he meant to say
'submitted"' (312).
Fair enough. But one could also draw a different
conclusion. Perhaps using the term "consent" in the factual
sense is simply too confusing. Perhaps, in other words,
Westen should recommend a change in usage, by legal
actors and others. "Factual consent" could then be replaced
by alternative language, such as factual "agreement,"
"choice," "acquiescence," "willingness," or "submission." At
the very least, it seems clear that the language employed in
criminal legislation should explicitly differentiate factual
from legally valid consent, using the term "consent" only to
identify legally valid consent, and using alternative
language in lieu of factual "consent."9
An analogous terminological difficulty is the criminal
law's "voluntariness" requirement. This requirement is a
very minimal one: it requires that the actor have control
over, or a substantial capacity to control, his movements,
but it does not require that the actor's choice to act be free
of unfair or coercive threats. So a decision to assist a
criminal in order to avoid a threat of death counts as a
7. 735 P. 2d 440 (Wyo. 1987), discussed at 310-12.
8. Id. at 442-43.
9. Occasionally Westen himself endorses this last suggestion, e.g. 340
(suggesting that statutory language might be clearer if "incapable of consent"
were defined as "physically unable to communicate unwillingness to submit to
[the] act...").
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"voluntary" act, although of course it might be excused by
the doctrine of duress. Now we could have two
"voluntariness" doctrines: minimal voluntariness
(analogous to factual consent) and legally sufficient
voluntariness, defined as a (minimally voluntary) choice
that is not unduly coerced (analogous to legal consent). But
it is much less confusing to employ "voluntariness" for one
idea and "duress" for the other; and a similar
disambiguation of "consent" would be preferable.
Turning to the details of Westen's account of factual
consent, his analysis is quite illuminating. As he suggests,
factual consent can properly include not only S's
unconditional enthusiasm but also her conditional
preference: "given the circumstances that she believes
exist, she consciously prefers sexual intercourse to what
she believes to be the alternative" (29)-for example, she
prefers intercourse to serious injury or death (on one
extreme) or to disappointing her lover by waiting until
later (at the other). ° Westen also argues, against several
commentators, that factual consent does not and should not
depend on S possessing a subjective attitude by which she
consciously authorizes what would otherwise be a moral
and legal wrong. Westen is persuasive here. Although legal
consent has the effect of permitting A to do what would
otherwise infringe S's legal rights, it hardly follows, Westen
10. The language "conscious preference" is more apt than the language of
"desire" that Westen sometimes employs here, for several reasons. First, S might
choose intercourse with great reluctance, and thus with none of the positive affect
implicit in "desire." Second, a desire need not be an occurrent mental state. If I
desire to marry Christine, then fall asleep, it is not the case that while asleep, I
no longer desire to marry her. By the same token, if my desire is, "Please kiss me,
Christine, when you enter the room, whether or not I am asleep," it would be
incorrect to say that when she does kiss my slumbering hulk, I do not desire this.
This is relevant to Westen's later claim that a sleeping or unconscious S does not
factually consent. The claim is plausible but difficult to maintain if desire rather
than conscious preference suffices for factual consent. (That claim is consistent
with my consenting to be kissed in the last example, since I give prospective
consent, a form of consent that is independent from contemporaneous consent, as
Westen lucidly explains in a later chapter.) And third, the language of "desire" is
susceptible to the mistaken view that if a woman experiences sexual desires and
feelings of arousal when she is violently forced to have sex, she factually consents.
(Westen properly rejects this view (36).)
correctly claims, that S's state of mind must itself consist of
consciously granting A legal permission (31). After all, S
might be completely ignorant of her legal rights, or might
even mistakenly believe that she lacks the authority to give
legal consent, and yet her state of mind of acquiescence
might be sufficient to constitute legal consent (32).
Torts scholars will find Westen's argument familiar.
"Express" assumption of risk consists in an explicit waiver
of one's legal right to sue in case a risk materializes, but
this is sharply distinguished from "implied" assumption of
risk, which (in jurisdictions that still recognize it) consists
in a knowing and voluntary choice to confront a risk. One
can impliedly assume a risk without expressly assuming it,
and vice versa. (If I choose to ski a very challenging course,
this can consist in implied assumption of risk even if I
believe that notwithstanding my choice, I retain the legal
right to sue;12 and if I sign a valid waiver of liability when
joining a health club, I am barred from recovery even if I
am unaware of the particular risk that caused my injury,
so long as the waiver encompassed the risk of that injury.)
The most interesting subcategory of factual consent
recognized by Westen is "indifference." This is a state of
mind, not of indecisiveness, but of affirmative willingness
11. See Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L.
Rev. 481, 487 (2002).
12. But there might be a disanalogy between criminal law and tort conceptions
of authorization. In criminal law, Westen points out, a jurisdiction might want to
require subjective authorization, which would then be a subset of factual consent.
"Mental states of authorizing are nothing more than mental states of desire, plus
awareness of one's right to refuse" (33). Then it would be contradictory for S to say
"I do not authorize you to kiss me, but I fervently desire that you do so." But tort
law does not employ the notion of subjective authorization in this way, at least when
consent to a risk is at issue. One can subjectively decline to waive a right to sue and
yet act in such a way as to impliedly assume a risk (as in the skiing example in the
text). Note, finally, that there is nothing in the slightest contradictory in S wanting
to have sex with A but also wanting A to be prosecuted for it. (This is precisely what
occurs in one of the final, pivotal scenes in the 1994 film noir, The Last Seduction.)
But in this last example, presumably Westen would say that S did legally authorize
sex, though she also wishes the legal system would ignore her authorization or
would mistakenly treat her as not having given such authorization. (In the film, S
pretends not to consent and secretly records the encounter in order to frame A for
rape.)
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to delegate the decision to another. A jurisdiction might
well decide to count such indifference as factual consent
with respect to sexual relations, but not with respect to
termination of one's life support by a doctor (30); for the
latter, it might require either unconditional endorsement
or conditional preference. Thus, Westen believes that an
unconditional or conditional preference always suffices for
factual consent, while indifference might or might not
suffice (31).
One striking benefit of the indifference conception is
its ability to explain and legitimize some of the
spontaneous decisions that frequently occur in sexual
encounters. Although Westen does not develop this point, I
believe that this idea of delegation of decision making helps
explain why it can be acceptable for a couple that has
agreed to a certain level of sexual intimacy to permit one
party to initiate a surprising and novel form of sexual
encounter (such as a different mode of sexual contact or of
intercourse). To be sure, one could conceptualize the
permissibility of such decisions by requiring S only to
consent to "sexual intercourse" rather than to "sexual
intercourse with the woman on top" or to "anal
intercourse," and so forth. Yet we avoid some of the
difficulties of accurately characterizing the object of S's
consent if we expand the meaning of factual consent to
encompass indifference. So even if S only meant to
acquiesce (in the sense of conditional or unconditional
preference) to vaginal intercourse with A in the
"missionary" position, and even if that is the most
appropriate level of generality at which to characterize her
factual consent, the broader idea of indifference or
delegation of decision making permits us to count as
factual consent S's express or implied authorization to A to
initiate other sexual contacts-e.g., those of a similar level
of physical intimacy.
Nevertheless, Westen's analysis of indifference as a
type of factual consent presents some potential difficulties,
of interpretation and also of substance. First, indifference
to x in Westen's sense does not really amount to S's choice
588
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of x under the circumstances, or even to S's desire for x. It
is not enough to point out, as Westen does, that in such a
case, S desires what A desires, and thus in some sense
consciously chooses x (conditionally, in case A desires it).
Although we could indeed speak of such a case as involving
voluntary submission or acquiescence, characterizing this
as a choice or desire for sexual intercourse is an
exaggeration. Still, it might indeed be appropriate to say in
this case that S acquiesces in x, and in that less robust
sense "consents" to x.
Second, Westen's analysis of indifference has a crucial
implication for a highly controversial issue in contemporary
rape law. Presumably one reason (among many) for the
view of some jurisdictions that (to put it crudely) only a
"yes" means "yes"'13 is that only an affirmative verbal or
nonverbal expression of preference genuinely constitutes
sufficient consent. Such a jurisdiction might conclude that
a woman who is merely indifferent in Westen's sense, who
passively permits sexual acts without affirmatively
welcoming or choosing the act, or without preferring the act
to the alternatives, is not acting with sufficient autonomy
to have legally consented. And it might so conclude even if
the woman explicitly says to the man, "I don't care what
you do; go ahead [with sexual intercourse] if you want 
to."14
It is, of course, highly controversial whether this approach
goes too far, criminalizing conduct that is insufficiently
culpable and effectuating a notion of autonomy that is
overly paternalistic. But Westen's framework should be
13. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). See also Wis. Stat. § 940.225
(2005), recognizing as third-degree sexual assault nonconsensual intercourse, and
defining consent as "words or overt actions by a person ... indicating a freely
given agreement to have sexual intercourse .... " Of course, another reason for
the MTS view is the difficulty of distinguishing indecision or psychological
paralysis from genuine willingness to permit the sexual conduct to occur.
14. Whether MTS would criminalize sexual intercourse in this scenario is
unclear. But suppose a first date in which A persists over an extended period of
time in seeking S's consent to sex, and S repeatedly declines, but eventually is
worn down and says, "Well, OK, do what you want to do," still hoping that he will
give up. She then submits to sex. It is possible that this would not count as
"affirmative" and "freely-given" permission.
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capacious enough at least to make this approach
conceptually intelligible.
Westen might reply as follows. His framework does not
assume that factual consent is legal consent. A "'yes' means
,'yes'" jurisdiction might conclude that indifference counts
as factual consent but not legal consent. But this conclusion
does not fit the rest of Westen's approach, under which
factual consent fails to qualify as legal consent only if it
does not satisfy prescribed conditions of competence,
knowledge, and freedom, and it does not seem plausible to
characterize the failure to give affirmative consent as an
instance of incompetence or lack of sufficient freedom.
Alternatively, and more plausibly, such a jurisdiction
might say, at the outset, that only unconditional or
conditional preference, not indifference, counts as factual
consent, at least in certain circumstances (such as the first
sexual encounter between S and A). 5 While Westen
identifies this possibility, he should clarify that this is at
the very heart of one important contemporary debate about
the proper scope of criminal liability for sexual assault.
Third, I wonder whether Westen too quickly dismisses
the possibility that S's actual indecision (as opposed to her
decision to delegate the choice to A, as he characterizes
"indifference") should count as a (fourth) possible category
of attitudinal consent. Because his framework is meant to
apply to all forms of sexual contact, not just sexual
intercourse, I think it is at least an open question whether
a jurisdiction should criminalize A's conduct in this
scenario: A asks S for a kiss, S says nothing because of
hesitation or indecision, and A proceeds to kiss her. Indeed,
15. A refined and contextual approach is much more plausible than the
absolute view that indifference is never sufficient for legal consent. So even in a
jurisdiction that ordinarily requires one of the two core types of factual consent,
i.e., unconditional or conditional preference, in some cases indifference might be a
third option. Perhaps in the first sexual encounter between S and A, one of the
two core types of factual consent should be required, while in later encounters,
indifference suffices. Or perhaps a core type of factual consent should be required
with respect to the first instance of (any form of) sexual intercourse, while




whether A's proceeding to engage in sexual intercourse
with S in the face of her indecision should count as rape (or
some other crime) is also a question that some jurisdictions
would answer negatively.
To be sure, Westen does have another route to a
conclusion of non-liability in these cases. He can say that
they fall within a larger category of cases in which S
constructively consents, one of Westen's three categories of
fictional consent (which I discuss further below). For
various policy reasons, including protection of the non-
culpable, a jurisdiction might elect to deem S to consent
here, even though she doesn't really consciously acquiesce
to the contact or intercourse (just as a fastidious football
fan who prefers not to be touched by other fans and is
deemed to consent to minor, predictable physical contacts
does not actually acquiesce to such contacts, an example
discussed further below). But this solution seems ad hoc.
Don't we want a general rule about acts of physical and
sexual contact by A in the face of S's indecision? Doesn't
that general rule reflect a general principle about the
proper scope of S's autonomy, rather than a fiction of non-
consent? I think it would be more straightforward to
classify indecision as a fourth category of consent that a
jurisdiction might (or, of course, might not) elect to
recognize, depending on the sexual assault policies that it
endorses.
Towards the end of his discussion of attitudinal
consent, Westen identifies the minimal cognitive and
volitional content of S's preference for x that he believes is
required for attitudinal consent. 16 Let me briefly comment
16. Westen identifies the minimum cognitive content of factual consent as
follows: "the description of the conduct she has in mind is an instance of what the
criminal statute at issue describes to be the conduct that it prohibits in the
absence of legal consent" (41). Thus, if S decides to have sex with A whom she
believes is her husband but is actually an impersonator, then whether this counts
as factual consent depends on whether the statute defines the prohibited act as
sexual intercourse simpliciter or as sexual intercourse with a specifically chosen
partner. Of course, even on the former interpretation, S's factual consent is not
necessarily legally valid consent; A's fraud about his identity might vitiate factual
consent.
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on the volitional requirement, since Westen here makes a
surprising but, I believe, convincing claim: S can factually
consent to x even if (without knowing this) she is
completely unable to prevent x. Drawing on Meir Dan-
Cohen's distinction between subjective willing and
selecting from within a set of genuine options, Westen
argues that only subjective willing is required for
attitudinal consent. He imagines variations of the Snow
White story, in which "Snow Blanche" and "Snow Bianca"
appear to be asleep but are conscious, yet still are unable to
prevent the prince's kiss. Suppose Snow Blanche
unconditionally wishes to be kissed by him, because she
would like to be kissed by him even if she were not under a
spell. And suppose Snow Bianca only conditionally wishes
to be kissed as the best option then available to her (i.e.,
the only way to avoid continued paralysis). Both should be
understood as factually consenting despite their inability to
prevent the kiss (44-45).
This is an important and underappreciated point,
especially in the context of less intimate forms of sexual
contact. If S says to A, "please kiss me," he or she might
well be unable to prevent a kiss that immediately follows. S
might also subjectively welcome an impetuous, completely
unexpected kiss by A (222). And by the same token, as
Westen points out, disabled individuals who wish to have
sexual intercourse with their partners yet are physically
unable to prevent it certainly should not need to fear that
their partners have committed rape.
One last issue about attitudinal consent concerns the
range of the relevant choice set over which we evaluate S's
At several places in the book, Westen's analysis illuminates the cognitive
requirements for both factual and legal consent, especially with respect to the
problematic distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement,
but I do not have the space to address the arguments here.
Westen also identifies a minimum degree of competence required for factual
consent-namely, "a minimal capacity to adjudge what one desires for oneself
under the circumstances as one perceives them to be" (35). He later emphasizes
that jurisdictions require additional conditions of competence (for example,




preferences. Clearly enough, Westen intends to include all
the options that A presents to S, including unpalatable
threats if S does not submit and attractive benefits to S if
she does. But he also indicates that he includes as options
actions that S herself could take to avoid the options that A
presents (see 87). So S factually consents not only when she
agrees to have sex in order to avoid a threat of physical
harm, or to obtain a job benefit, but also when she submits
rather than taking the affirmative step of pushing him
away-or, for that matter, rather than taking the
extraordinary step of killing him with a knife, if that would
prevent intercourse.
Now this might seem unproblematic, insofar as factual
consent is merely the first step of analysis. So just as an
affirmative decision by S to submit to sex rather than face
a violent threat will certainly not satisfy the "freedom"
condition required for legally valid consent, so her decision
not to push A away or not to kill him when she has the
opportunity to do so might not satisfy that condition. Yet
there is a certain awkwardness to this way of framing the
issue. Suppose A meets S at a party, takes her to his room,
initiates minor sexual contact, then makes it clear that he
is about to initiate sexual intercourse. Suppose S is then
passive and silent, but wishes he would stop. Suppose she
also believes he will stop if but only if she slaps him. On
Westen's account, she factually consents if she does not
slap him but submits passively to his initiative. (Indeed,
she also factually consents if she believes he will stop if but
only if she mortally wounds him with a knife, which she
declines to do.)
Of course, the jurisdiction might have a rule to the
effect that preference for submitting to sex when the only
practical alternative is resistance to the utmost, or even
resistance entailing A's death, is not sufficiently "free" to
qualify as legally valid consent. But that is a strange
conception of "freedom," and it seems much more
straightforward to deny at the outset that S's option of
taking affirmative steps to avoid A's advances (even to the
point of violently disabling A) is within the choice set for
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determining factual consent. With such a denial, we can
say that when S does not express a conscious preference for
submitting to sex over any alternatives offered by A
(because A offers no other alternatives), then S does not
unconditionally or conditionally prefer sex to any relevant
alternative, and factual consent is lacking from the outset.
I raise this point because it will be crucial later in
examining and critiquing Westen's controversial claim that
resistance requirements are entirely unproblematic
because they are merely logical corollaries of a
jurisdiction's force requirement.
B. Factual "Expressive" Consent
We have thus far been discussing attitudinal consent.
But Westen persuasively argues that a distinct category of
factual consent, factual expressive consent, is also
commonly used in legal and academic discourse, ordinary
language, and criminal legislation-for example, when
courts say that S "expressly consented" or "verbally
consented." (If, however, they say that S "communicated
consent" or "conveyed consent," they are referring to what
is being expressed, that is, to attitudinal consent (65).) In
Westen's view, "expressive" consent is properly defined by
reference to what A's interpretive community (essentially,
a reasonable person in A's shoes 7) would understand the
words and conduct of S to mean, and not by reference to
what A alone understands them to mean, nor by reference
to what S intends them to mean.
Westen describes two extremely provocative cases that
clearly illustrate the distinction between attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent. In the first, People v.
Burnham, the victim enticed passing motorists to have sex
in order to avoid her husband's threat of violence (of which
the strangers were unaware).8 In the second, People v.
Bink, the victim, a prison inmate who had been previously
17. For some reason, Westen avoids the more familiar "reasonable person"
language, but his notion appears to be substantially equivalent.
18. 222 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1985), discussed at 139-40.
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raped by the defendant, worked with the jail authorities to
entrap the defendant: he pretended to be in fear of physical
harm and allowed the authorities to secretly observe the
defendant commit sodomy, knowing that the police would
be able to intervene before the defendant could actually
make good his violent threat.' 9 As Westen persuasively
analyzes the cases, the strangers' sexual contact in
Burnham involved "expressive" consent but not attitudinal
consent: although the victim did not subjectively acquiesce,
she did actively express such acquiescence to the
strangers.2 ° By contrast, the sexual encounter in Bink
involved attitudinal consent but not "expressive" consent:
although the victim did subjectively acquiesce in order to
entrap defendant, his outward expression was of non-
acquiescence.
Given his definitions, Westen draws two conclusions.
First, "expressive" consent is derivative of attitudinal
consent, insofar as what must be "expressed" in some
manner is any of the species of attitudinal consent that the
jurisdiction recognizes (unconditional preference,
conditional preference, and perhaps "indifference"). Second,
attitudinal consent defines the actus reus of rape, while
"expressive" consent is best understood as defining the
mens rea. Thus, in Burnham, since S was not subjectively
19. 444 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), discussed at 140.
20. In a footnote, Westen makes the interesting argument that we would have
attitudinal consent, and not merely "expressive" consent, in Burnham if the
victim, in order to avoid her husband's threats, had to actually succeed in having
sex with the stranger rather than merely trying to do so. For in that case, she
would have preferred sex as the best she could do for herself in the circumstances,
and thus would have factually consented attitudinally as well as expressively.
Moreover, Westen argues, the strangers would not have imposed a wrongful harm
on her, since they would have done what she believed best for herself, and they
were not responsible for her predicament (165 n.18). I agree that this would be a
case of attitudinal consent in Westen's terms, but it is less clear that this would
be a case of legally valid consent. Whether it should count as legal consent does
not matter much if (as in the actual example) the strangers lack mens rea. But
suppose a variation of the facts in which they were negligent in not realizing that
she was just going along to avoid her husband's threats. Shouldn't they be liable,
not just for attempted rape, but for rape (assuming that the jurisdiction requires
a mens rea of negligence as to non-consent)? Note that if they are only liable for
attempted rape, that also seems to be true of the husband-an implausible result.
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willing and did not give attitudinal consent, the actus reus
of rape is satisfied; but since she did not express that
unwillingness by the words or conduct the jurisdiction
requires under "expressive" consent, the strangers in that
case lacked the mens rea for rape. Conversely, in Bink,
since the defendant might reasonably have understood S to
have not expressed subjective willingness, though actually,
S was subjectively willing, the defendant cannot be guilty
of the actus reus of rape, and this is indeed what the court
held.21 However, Westen points out that Bink might be
guilty of attempted rape (161-62).
Westen goes on to explain, convincingly, that the
venerable "moral luck" problem applies in this context.
That problem-whether a defendant should suffer lesser
punishment because the legislatively proscribed harm
fortuitously fails to occur, even if he still has the requisite
mens rea as to the harm-arises here only if lack of consent
is understood as a question of actus reus, but not if it is
understood as an issue of mens rea (156-57). In other
words, the question whether Bink should be punished less
because of the fortuity, from his perspective, that his victim
consented (in the sense of attitudinal consent), is answered
21. Nevertheless, Bink could be interpreted differently. The victim's decision
to entrap the defendant by engaging in sex might be interpreted as factual
consent but not legally valid consent, given the very constrained alternatives the
victim faced. (Suppose he reasonably doubted that the jail authorities could
adequately protect him from defendant if he did not cooperate in the entrapment
scheme.) Indeed, suppose a different case in which A rapes S, and S then pretends
to agree to further sex with him, but only in order to keep him in her apartment
for a few more minutes, when she expects her husband to return home and be
able to apprehend A. It surely would be reasonable for a jurisdiction to consider
the second act of intercourse rape, because of the conditions under which the
factual agreement to engage in intercourse was secured.
A more straightforward case than Bink of attitudinal consent but no
"expressive" consent, in which attitudinal consent is much more clearly also
sufficient for legal consent, would be a case in which the victim unconditionally
wants to have sex with A, but conveys this by words or conduct that should be
taken by someone in A's position as nonacquiescence. (Imagine a case of a serious
language barrier. Or consider Westen's example of A unknowingly joining a
swinger's club one of whose members, S, expresses sexual interest in A with
unusual signals of interest that A does not (and has no reason to) recognize. If A
then proceeds to suddenly kiss and fondle S, then S has given attitudinal consent,
but not "expressive" consent (74).)
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affirmatively if one accepts the moral luck principle and if
attitudinal consent eliminates the social harm of rape. But
if only "expressive" consent, not attitudinal consent,
eliminates the social harm of rape, the question is
answered negatively.
Westen's first conclusion is certainly plausible: an
expression must be an expression of something, and
analytic simplicity is served by defining "expressive"
consent precisely in terms of attitudinal consent. But the
second conclusion, understanding attitudinal consent as
vitiating actus reus and "expressive" consent as vitiating
mens rea, is not nearly so obvious. For it depends on a
definition of "expressive" consent that might be too narrow,
and on an understanding of the actus reus of rape that is
controversial, in light of contemporary debates about the
proper scope of rape law.
At the risk of adding unnecessary complexity to
Westen's already intricate model, I suggest that there are
at least three categories of factual consent, not two. I also
believe that it is intelligible for a jurisdiction to conclude
that the social harm of rape occurs when either of two of
these three types of factual consent is missing. Accordingly,
Westen's conclusion that that social harm occurs only when
attitudinal consent is lacking is too narrow-at least, it is
too narrow to explain the social policies that some
jurisdictions purport to favor in modern sexual assault law.
Let me explain.
Westen is undoubtedly correct to expand factual
consent beyond attitudinal consent (S's subjective but
unexpressed willingness or preference), and to focus on S's
communication of consent as an important type of factual
consent. But a paradigm communication in the current
context has two components-an intention to communicate
by S, and an interpretation or understanding of that
communication by A. Westen emphasizes only the second
component. Yet a jurisdiction might have reason to
recognize either or both components as a conception of
factual consent. Thus, I would replace factual "expressive"
consent with the following two categories of factual consent:
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FSEC: Factual subjectively expressed consent (where S
employs words or conduct by which she intends22
to communicate her attitudinal consent)
FOC: Factual observed consent (where an observer-
either A, or A's "interpretive community," or a
reasonable person in A's shoes-understands S's
words and conduct to satisfy attitudinal
consent)
23
Sometimes a jurisdiction might want to require (before it will
find legal consent) the outward expression of subjectively
expressed consent, rather than attitudinal consent, in order to
assure that acquiescence reflects a relatively firm, rather
than fleeting or changeable, state of mind.24 The very act of
22. Burnham is a clear case of such an intention.
It might be appropriate to expand this definition to S's employing words or
conduct by which she intends to communicate her attitudinal consent, or that she
expects others to understand as attitudinal consent (even if she does not so intend
them). I don't pursue this complication.
23. Indeed, a comprehensive approach would include a fourth category as well.
The actus reus of rape could be defined either by lack of attitudinal consent or by
lack of subjectively expressed consent. (It is even possible to define it as lack of
observed consent, though this is the least plausible alternative.) And observed
consent could be subdivided into two corresponding categories: where the observer
understands S's words and conduct to satisfy attitudinal consent (Westen's
"expressive" consent fits here), and where he understands them to satisfy
subjectively expressed consent. But I will spare the reader further subcategories.
24. This function is somewhat analogous to the act requirement's function of
ensuring that a defendant's criminal intention is seriously entertained and not
fleeting, or the function of actus reus requirements of attempt in ensuring that a
defendant is seriously committed to a criminal plan. Of course, here the absence
of a "firm" state of mind leads to the conclusion that the victim has not consented,
and thus that the defendant can be criminally punished.
Westen argues that there is no need to build into factual consent a
requirement that the mental state be firm, unequivocal, or stable. If S is
indecisive, or in a paralyzing panic, or if she is vacillating such that she does not
factually consent at the time she submits to intercourse, then a jurisdiction could
decide that she simply lacks factual consent (159). In any event, he points out, a
requirement that A have mens rea with respect to S's lack of factual consent
helps protect against unfair punishment in such circumstances.
Perhaps Westen is correct about the proper understanding of attitudinal
consent, and perhaps in some circumstances even a fleetingly experienced
unwillingness to acquiesce should make a sexual encounter criminal. But I think
the complexities and possible different views of desirable policy here reinforce the
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communicating, which requires some self-consciousness and
some effort to articulate feelings, at least renders it more
likely that the underlying state of mind communicated is
more stable. But a jurisdiction might go one step further and
require observed consent-that an observer (perhaps a
reasonable observer) recognize that S factually consents-
either because lawmakers want to protect defendants they
view as less culpable, or because they believe that the victim
should try to effectively communicate her preferences to the
other. (Observed consent is what Westen calls "expressive"
consent, but I use a different label to emphasize the
perspective of the observer; "expressive" consent is ambiguous
in this regard, for it could refer either to the communicator S
or to the observer.)
To place subjectively expressed consent in context,
compare the way in which a jurisdiction might choose to deal
with a different crime involving a victim's mental state. If it
is a crime, or an aggravated element of a crime, to terrorize
a person, the victim's state of mind is of course directly
relevant: the actus reus is satisfied only if she actually is put
in a state of terror, though the mens rea can be satisfied
(and an attempt conviction obtained) even if she is not put in
such a state, if the defendant intends that effect on the
victim (or perhaps if he believes or should believe that his
conduct will have that effect). Indeed, in the law of sexual
assault, the question whether S has submitted "because of
fear" of violence from A arises frequently, and should receive
a similar analysis: the actus reus requirement of "threat of
force" is satisfied if S was actually in fear, and submitted for
that reason, while the mens rea requirement can receive
separate analysis. (Again, even if S does not actually submit
due to fear, perhaps A should be guilty of attempted rape if
he intended to cause her submission through fear; and
perhaps, in the rare case when the defendant is reasonably
ignorant of the fact that he induced S to submit by fear, he
should be acquitted.)
25
value of recognizing subjectively expressed consent as another category of factual
consent.
25. Westen provides a nice analysis of the confused approach of some
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In these two examples, terrorizing and inducing consent
by fear, no one would seriously suggest that the victim must
affirmatively express or communicate her subjective state of
terror or fear in order to have suffered the social harm in
question. In other words, there is no good reason to adopt
the analogue of subjectively expressed consent here. But in
cases where S passively submits to sex with A, many
jurisdictions and many commentators do conclude that the
social harm of sexual assault is not implicated if S could
have communicated non-consent but failed to do so. The
social policy-albeit a controversial one-is that each
participant to sexual conduct has a responsibility to
communicate their preferences to the other, absent some
significant incapacity, and that the criminal law should not
intervene when this responsibility has not been met. This
policy is better captured by the proposed subjectively
expressed consent category than by Westen's attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent categories.
To see in more detail how my approach differs from
Westen's, consider a case in which S says and means "yes"
or "no" to A's request for a form of sexual intimacy, but A
literally does not hear her (and a reasonable person in his
position also would not have heard her). Under Westen's
approach, the only factual consent questions we ask are
whether S was subjectively willing (attitudinal consent)
and whether a reasonable person would have interpreted
her as having conveyed subjective willingness ("expressive"
consent, which I treat as a subcategory of observed
consent).26
jurisdictions on these issues. Some conclude that a conviction for rape by threat
requires a "reasonable fear" by the victim. But this is ambiguous: it could refer to
the defendant's reasonable belief that the victim submitted out of fear, but it
could also refer to whether the victim's actual fearful reaction was a reaction that
a reasonable person in her situation would have had. As Westen points out, there
is no good reason for the second requirement, so long as the defendant was
actually aware that the victim, however "unreasonably" or surprisingly, was
subjectively fearful and submitted only for that reason (320-21).
26. I believe that Westen's terminology, factual expressive consent, is
unfortunate: although Westen means to restrict it to an actual or hypothetical




But suppose a jurisdiction wants to codify the
approach that "only 'yes' means 'yes,"' i.e., that only an
affirmative expression of acquiescence (by words or
conduct) immediately preceding sexual intercourse suffices
for legal consent.2 ' Although controversial, this approach is
one that some jurisdictions and many commentators
support. One reason (among many) for this view is that
only such an affirmative expression of preference genuinely
constitutes sufficient consent. S's passive submission to a
sexual act without affirmatively welcoming or choosing the
act arguably is not an instance of a sufficiently robust type
of agency or autonomy to count as legal consent, just as
passive submission to a medical procedure is clearly not
enough to count as legal consent.28
It is much more difficult to model this approach and all
of its plausible variants on Westen's account than under
my suggested approach.29 Suppose, once again, that the
jurisdiction wants to reinforce a community norm that even
in situations when A is not threatening S with any
disadvantage if she says "no" to his initiatives, "only 'yes'
means 'yes"--i.e., only affirmative words or conduct by
which S expresses acquiescence (only an especially
unambiguous, affirmative instance of subjectively
expressed consent) will count as legal consent. Then it
would make sense to define the actus reus of rape as sexual
intercourse absent affirmative subjectively expressed
27. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation
and the Failure of Law 261-73 (1998).
28. See id. at 270. Of course, there are other reasons for this view, including
the difficulty of distinguishing indecision or psychological paralysis from genuine
willingness to permit the sexual conduct to occur.
29. Westen asserts at one point that no jurisdiction uses what I call the
subjectively expressed consent approach (70). But this seems incorrect: New
Jersey law (as interpreted in MTS, 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992)) appears to employ
this approach, and the same might be true of other states' explicit requirements
of "freely-given" consent. See, e.g., Wisc. Stat. § 940.225(4) ("'Consent,' as used in
this section, means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give
informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse
or sexual contact."). See also Cal. Penal Code § 261.6 (Deering Supp. 2003)
("[Clonsent shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will.").
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consent. And then the jurisdiction has the option to require
negligence, recklessness, or even knowledge as the
requisite mens rea. (It might plausibly choose knowledge
that S has said "yes" or has by her conduct expressed
affirmative permission in order to offer greater protection
to defendants who are unfamiliar with the novel legal actus
reus requirement. °) But it is difficult to see how Westen
can convey these different mens rea variations within his
model, for he largely neglects the subjectively expressed
consent category, and he defines "expressive" consent too
simply as posing only the question whether A was
reasonable or unreasonable (i.e, negligent) as to whether S
gave attitudinal consent."
Accordingly, his general point, that attitudinal consent
pertains to actus reus while "expressive" consent pertains
to mens rea, is inaccurate. To be sure, a jurisdiction could
decide to organize its sexual offense crimes that way. But it
might also have reason to recognize other variations in
what counts as the social harm of rape (lack of subjectively
expressed consent, not lack of attitudinal consent), and
what counts as adequate mens rea.32 Some jurisdictions
30. In MTS, the court interpreted the New Jersey statute as requiring, for the
actus reus of rape, affirmative permission, while requiring, for the mens rea, only
negligence as to whether such permission had been given. But the requirements
are independent; the second hardly follows from the first, and a mens rea
requirement of recklessness or knowledge is also defensible. 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J.
1992).
31. Westen's careful definition of "expressive" consent and of the relevant
perspective of the observer is a composite, encompassing the beliefs that the
actual defendant has, as well as beliefs that a reasonable person would acquire
(72). But it would be better to employ a definition that permits a jurisdiction to
disaggregate knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, in case it wishes to employ
a mens rea other than negligence.
Westen does acknowledge that "expressive" consent (as he defines it) offers
a less precise measure of an actor's guilty mind than the combination of
attitudinal consent and a mens rea requirement offers. As he notes, the latter but
not the former approach can impose attempt liability on the malicious actor who
has good grounds for believing that the woman acquiesces yet intends that the
intercourse be without her acquiescence (145).
32. I also find problematical Westen's way of conceptualizing the difference
between actus reus and mens rea. In his view, where A has some form of mens
rea but S has given factual and legal consent, A causes a dignitary harm rather
than a material harm (149-52, 161-63).
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believe that the optimal policy (a) gives some, though
limited, protection to potential victims' autonomy interests
by requiring them to say "no," and (b) at the same time
facilitates sex by those who prefer not to have to say, or
very clearly communicate, "yes." Other jurisdictions are
more concerned about protecting victims who find it very
difficult to say "no." These questions should not be decided
or made unduly confusing by stipulative definition.
3
Of course, if the absence of subjectively expressed
consent or of some other type of communication of consent
is taken to negate the social harm of a crime, then the
question whether S satisfied the subjective standards of
attitudinal consent is simply legally irrelevant. Just as
contract law considers the private, subjective beliefs of the
parties to be irrelevant (as Westen acknowledges), a
jurisdiction could take the same view of private beliefs
But the difference between lack of "expressive" consent and lack of
attitudinal consent, or more generally between lack of mens rea and lack of actus
reus, need not be conceptualized in this way. Yes, typically the more egregious A's
mens rea, the more dignitary harm he causes to S. But suppose a case in which A
sexually assaults S, who is unconscious and never regains consciousness. There
still is good reason for punishment here. To be sure, the case could be
conceptualized as involving dignitary harm to the community as a whole. But
that seems just a roundabout way of saying that a person who acts with such
disrespect for others deserves severe condemnation and punishment. The linkage
to "dignitary harm" seems contingent and unnecessary.
In his separate article, Westen goes so far as to treat larceny as imposing
only a "dignitary" harm, because its actus reus is satisfied by a temporary
deprivation of property, which is a derivative form of harm, as compared to the
primary harm of permanent deprivation. Westen, supra note 5, at 346. But unless
we classify as merely "dignitary" every inchoate crime (such as burglary or
possession) or indeed every crime that punishes the causation of a statutorily
defined harm in part because this could lead to further social harms (such as
treason, bribery, or hate crimes), I would think that the social harm of a
temporary deprivation of property should fall on the "material harm" side of the
distinction between externalized harm in the world, on the one hand, and a mere
belief that one is bringing about that harm (or some other culpable mens rea as to
bringing about the harm), on the other.
33. Indeed, even if we confine ourselves to Westen's two categories, attitudinal
consent and "expressive" consent, a jurisdiction should not necessarily assume
that mens rea requirements and "expressive" consent are coextensive. It could
decide, for example, to require recklessness or knowledge as to attitudinal
consent, even though a requirement of "expressive" consent is, on Westen's
account, essentially equivalent to a requirement of negligence with respect to
attitudinal consent.
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about consent to rape or other crimes. 4 For an example
where this view might be plausible, consider one of
Westen's illustrations: Jane expresses voluntary
acquiescence to A but secretly expects and hopes that A
will regard her expression as a joke (163). Certainly in
contexts other than rape, such as physical battery, a legal
rule that public communication defines the wrong is
defensible. Note, too, that once we redefine the social harm
in this way, a mistake of fact about attitudinal consent that
was once legally relevant now becomes, in effect, an
irrelevant mistake of law. In a jurisdiction in which "only
'yes' means 'yes,"' if A makes a reasonable mistake in
believing that S unconditionally desired sex with him, the
mistake is legally irrelevant if S did not affirmatively
express agreement. And if A doesn't realize that absent
affirmatively indicated agreement, he could be guilty of
rape, then that, too, is an irrelevant mistake (about the
scope of the criminal law).
The broader framework that I have suggested also
more easily accommodates additional permutations. For
example, a jurisdiction might employ "only 'yes' means
'yes' for the first sexual encounter between individuals, or
their first act of sexual intercourse, or for any use of
extrinsic force during the sexual act, but it might not
require such affirmative expressions of consent if the
couple has a prior sexual history.
To be sure, Westen might use the reasonable person
(or interpretive community) rubric to capture the idea of
subjectively expressed consent. Perhaps it is just not
reasonable for A to think S has given attitudinal consent
unless he observes that S has tried to express attitudinal
consent by word or conduct; inferring attitudinal consent
from silence is just "unreasonable." But I seriously doubt
that this is in all cases the correct understanding of what a
"reasonable" interpreter would infer. Moreover, this
34. For an example of a jurisdiction that explicitly relies on the contract
analogy in defining consent to rape, see State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn.
1989) ("[Wlhether a complainant has consented to intercourse depends upon her
manifestations of such consent as reasonably construed.").
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approach submerges the critical normative questions
within the murky category of reasonableness. If a state's
social policy, one that it wishes to announce and reinforce,
is the rule of behavior that "only 'yes' means 'yes,"' it is far
more perspicuous to say so directly.
Westen is not without other resources to articulate the
"only 'yes' means 'yes' approach, but his framework
handicaps him. Suppose a case in which S does not satisfy
the criteria of attitudinal consent, does not say anything in
response to A's initiatives, and passively submits to
intercourse. Jurisdictions differ about whether this should
count as a crime of sexual assault. On my approach: (1) a
jurisdiction that wishes to criminalize this conduct (even if
A honestly and reasonably believes that attitudinal consent
is present) would say that legally valid consent to sexual
assault requires subjectively expressed consent, which is
lacking here, and which A will usually know is lacking; but
(2) a jurisdiction that does not wish automatically to
criminalize such conduct would say that, while legal
consent requires only attitudinal consent, in this scenario A
would often have a defense of lack of mens rea as to S's lack
of attitudinal consent. Yet Westen's approach cannot
readily model or explain these results.
Westen does explicitly analyze two topics relevant to
the current discussion-the Antioch College version of
"only 'yes' means 'yes,"' which actually goes so far as to
require a verbal affirmative permission, and the similar
debate over whether "'no' always means 'no."' With respect
to the Antioch policy, Westen points out that under speech
act theory, saying "yes" in response to a request for sex is
an assertive illocutionary act that is a paradigmatic form of
expressive consent (79). But, he observes, this
characterization says little about the normative desirability
of a "yes" requirement, which many rape reformers reject
as too narrow a test of legally valid consent, but which
others find insufficient (79). And in the end, Westen
believes that the Antioch approach is not really a definition
of factual consent at all. Instead, he says, it reflects a
judgment that legally valid consent is not satisfied by
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either attitudinal consent or "expressive" consent, but
instead must take the form of a very specific type of"expressive" consent, verbal affirmative permission (77).
Although I agree with most of what Westen says here,
I am unpersuaded by his characterization of the Antioch
policy as identifying an instance of attitudinal consent that
fails to satisfy further criteria of legally valid consent. The
Antioch approach is concerned precisely with which kinds
of communications and expressions of acquiescence or
preference suffice for factual consent, which is a
precondition for legal consent. And although, as we will see
in more detail later, there are a number of reasons that
factual consent can fail to qualify as legally valid consent-
reasons of lack of competence, knowledge, or freedom-a
jurisdiction might well endorse the affirmative permission
approach for reasons that do not fall into these three
categories.
Let us turn to what Westen says about a different
bright-line norm, "'no' means 'no."' Westen points out that
this slogan means different things to different people.
Employing speech act theory, he explains that the slogan is
ambiguous. It can be a declaration: by uttering "no," the
woman thereby brings about the state of affairs in which
the man is required to stop or else be guilty of rape. But it
could instead be an illocutionary act: by uttering "no," the
woman is indicating something about her intention-
normally, that she wants the man to stop, but in some
cases, perhaps something else (such as "not yet, but keep
trying") (82). Interestingly enough, Westen observes, the
declarative sense can be satisfied even in cases where the
woman does not subjectively want the man to stop, because
by uttering the words "no" to an explicit or implicit request
35. If some version of subjectively expressed consent were recognized as an
alternative type of factual consent, S would still need to satisfy the additional
conditions of competence and the like in order to validly consent. The Antioch
policy and similar approaches certainly do not imply that a clear "yes" is always
sufficient for legal consent (for example, if this is in response to an explicit threat
of violence, and the demand, "Do you want to be hurt or do you want sex?").
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for sex, the woman actually changes the legal status of the
man's subsequent act, whatever her intentions.
This analysis is parallel to my analysis above of "only
'yes' means 'yes.'" In both situations, the actus reus of rape
or sexual assault can be defined in terms of explicit words
or expressive conduct by S: "yes" grants legal consent (at
least in certain circumstances), and "no" denies it. And in
each case, this legal conclusion can follow without regard to
S's attitudinal consent. This is a perfectly defensible
method of analysis, if one rejects Westen's belief that
attitudinal consent (in his sense) must always be the
cornerstone of legally valid consent. As I have explained,
there is at least as much reason to reject that belief as to
endorse it and then struggle to fit these two approaches
within Westen's other categories of constructive (fictional)
consent or of insufficient competence, knowledge, or
freedom to legally consent.
C. Prescriptive Consent
In his discussion of prescriptive consent, Westen
argues that three additional conditions are needed in order
to transform mere factual consent into legally valid
consent-specific conditions of freedom, knowledge, and
competence. I will review some of the valuable analysis
that he provides here, but will defer until later a discussion
of his most controversial claims about the (in)significance
of force and resistance requirements.
Addressing the "freedom" condition, Westen offers a
useful analysis of different possible conceptions of
"wrongful threats."36 Because factual consent is only a
36. More precisely, Westen draws a distinction between two kinds of (what he
calls) "wrongful force"-(1) wrongful threats, which are conditional and pressure
S to acquiesce in order to avoid the coercer making her situation worse; and (2)
wrongful oppression, which is unconditional and causes S to believe that under
the circumstances, acquiescence is preferable to nonacquiescence. An example of
the latter is where A makes S a captive and terrorizes her over a period of time in
such a way that eventually she prefers having sex with him to the alternatives,
although she does not do so in response to a threat (184). This is an illuminating
conceptual distinction; however, the first category is far more important in
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minimal requirement and does not by itself exclude as
"nonconsensual" even the most extreme threats of violence,
we need some additional principles to distinguish such
threats from relatively innocuous, noncriminal threats such
as a threat to break off a relationship. As Westen points
out, neither a predictive baseline nor a no-worsening
baseline is adequate: an actor might condition sex with S
on a threat not to help save S's child, but we might still
consider the threat illicit (182). Instead, Westen proposes a
normative baseline: a threat is wrongful if it would leave S
"in a worsened position as measured by the worst position
in which the criminal offense at issue allows a person to
leave another as a result of the latter's refusal to acquiesce
to x" (183; italics omitted). Alas, this proposal seems to beg
the question; for what we are looking for is a substantive
account of what that "worst position" is, or should be. (A
jurisdiction could choose a predictive baseline, or a no-
worsening baseline, or a baseline of "the worst position in
which that jurisdiction's laws otherwise permit a person to
leave another" (182, emphasis omitted),37 or something
else.) If Westen's point is that jurisdictions differ in the
approaches they take here, that would be worth
emphasizing; and he might also offer advice about the
policies and principles served by the respective different
approaches.
Westen then distinguishes, and excludes from the
category of "wrongful force," instances of compulsion, where
A overpowers S when S either is not in a position to make
any decision (for example, she is asleep or unconscious) or
when S is unable to prevent A from accomplishing
intercourse (185). In such a case, A brings about
intercourse without any act of will on S's part. Now
Westen's usage here is rather artificial: he concedes that
compulsion is an instance of force "broadly speaking" (185),
but it seems more accurate to say that his exclusion of
compulsion from "force" is using the latter term very
practice.
37. This is Wertheimer's proposal, which Westen rejects (182). See Alan
Wertheimer, Coercion 217-21 (1987).
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narrowly indeed. 8 Also, the term "compulsion" usually
connotes the use of physical force in order to overcome S,
contrary to her desires; but Westen also wishes to use the
term in cases when S invites or desires A's acts of
"compulsion." (A more accurate phrase might be
"overwhelming physical strength."39 ) Nevertheless,
terminology aside, Westen does offer a plausible reason for
the distinction: S could (on exceedingly rare occasions, he
should add!) actually subjectively welcome compulsion, so
even if she does not have power to prevent A's acts, she
might legally consent to them.4 °
Westen's analysis of compulsion is subtle but
important. For it also helps explain why, during acts of
intercourse, when commonly one participant is physically
unable (for brief periods of time) to prevent penetration, we
need not be in the awkward situation of first analyzing the
interaction as presumptively unjustifiable compulsion and
then explaining this away if but only if it is an instance of
advanced consent. (This scenario of acquiescence to
compulsion is even more common in acts of sexual contact
short of intercourse.) For in such cases, the participants
might not have considered and explicitly acquiesced to the
acts in advance, yet it would clearly be incorrect to
conclude that the compulsion makes the act rape, if S
welcomed the compulsion.41
38. In another respect, however, Westen uses "force" extremely broadly, as
any form of pressure on S's choice, as we shall see.
39. Westen, supra note 5, at 350.
40. Here, Westen imagines a (significant!) variation of the famous Morgan
case in which the woman's husband was telling the truth: she really did welcome
the acts of the airmen in surprising her in bed, holding her down, and successfully
having intercourse with her. DPP v. Morgan, [19751 2 W.L.R. 913, discussed at
186. A more common and credible example of his point would be where a woman
agrees with her partner to be passive in a type of rough sexual intercourse such
that she could not prevent intercourse even if she later wanted to.
41. But the question remains: should we distinguish "wrongful" from
legitimate compulsion, a distinction we do draw with threats? Or are compulsion
and threats radically different, as Westen implies? With compulsion, S has no
power to prevent A's acts. With threats, S does have this power, but her choice is
not legally "free" in those instances where the threat is wrongful. So with threats,
when S gives factual consent, this might or might not be legal consent. But with
compulsion, Westen seems to say, if this is one of the unusual cases in which S
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Westen's analysis of the "knowledge" requirement is
also enlightening. Fraud, he points out, undermines legal
consent "by ... misleading S into believing that subjective
acquiesce[ncel to x is more beneficial than it really is"
(188).42 And he provides an excellent analysis of the well-
known case, Boro v. Superior Court.43 In Boro, the
defendant pretended to be a doctor and duped the highly
gullible victim into believing that she was suffering a fatal
disease which could only be cured either by sleeping with
him or by undergoing painful and expensive surgery. The
court reluctantly concluded that the defendant did not
commit rape because the defendant's fraud merely
misrepresented the future benefits of his action. Westen
cogently critiques the state court's analysis of the case
solely in terms of fraud:
In reality, ... the harm Boro inflicted on Ms. R is better
classified as ... sexual intercourse by "force" or "threat."
After all, Boro did not simply mislead Ms. R regarding the
future benefits of having sexual intercourse; rather, he
instilled fear in her by causing her to believe that her
position had conditionally so changed for the worse that she
was induced, illicitly, to acquiesce to sexual intercourse that
she would otherwise have eschewed. (189)
Westen concludes that when fraud induces
acquiescence, the fraud vitiates consent "if S is induced by
A or a third person to acquiesce to x as a result of such false
beliefs regarding A or x ... that preclude a person who
relies upon them from being able to decide whether
engaging in x with A is truly in his or her interests" (189).
Unfortunately, this is more an analytical placeholder than
gives factual consent, this will always be legal consent, too (unless her knowledge
or competence is insufficient).
I believe that Westen is correct here: if S welcomes compulsion in a context
where A does not at the same time threaten a worse alternative, there seems no
basis for describing the compulsion as wrongful.
42. This passage contains one of a significant number of typographical errors
in the book. Presumably these will be corrected in a subsequent printing.
43. 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985).
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a usable criterion. It does not resolve whether lying, or
misleading statements, or mere omissions, can suffice; nor
whether the requisite false beliefs include not only such
compelling examples as a belief that A does not have AIDS,
but also less compelling ones, such as a belief that A is
unmarried, or that A truly loves S, and the like.
Finally, Westen persuasively argues, against
objections, that competence is a third condition of
prescriptive consent, independent of the other two
conditions (189). Young children, he points out, can be
freed from pressures and provided specific information, but
their acquiescence is still legally insufficient for legal
consent, because "they are too young to be able to assess
their long-term interests"(191); and the same may be true
of adults whose judgment is impaired by intoxicants or
mental disabilities.
D. Prospective and Retrospective Consent
One of the most fascinating chapters in the book
concerns the legal validity of consent that is given not
contemporaneously with x, but either prospectively or
retrospectively. As Westen explains, Anglo-American law
strongly privileges contemporaneous assessments, but
sometimes does recognize noncontemporaneous assessments,
though it does so much more frequently for prospective than
for retrospective consent (248).
With respect to prospective consent, Westen draws an
important distinction between cases in which S will later
be incapable of consent (e.g., where S executes a living will,
or where S consents to surgery during which S will be
unconscious) and cases in which S will later be capable of
consent.44 The latter category includes the classic story of
44. Westen says that that the rationale for allowing prospective consent when
S will later be incapable of consent is that this will enhance S's overall well-being
(250). This explanation seems too crude. Suppose S decides in a living will not to
permit extraordinary efforts to keep him alive. His rationale might be to save his
family expense or emotional trauma; to be legitimate, these reasons need not be
understood as contributing to S's overall well-being.
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Odysseus and the Sirens: Odysseus instructs his crew to tie
him to the mast and to ignore his later pleas to be untied,
so that he can hear the Sirens but not succumb to their
deadly entreaties. It also includes cases such as a timid
skydiver prospectively requesting to be pushed out the door
over the objection he knows he will raise at the time. In
this category of cases, Westen explains, the actor's
prospective consent, in order to be valid, must be
irrevocable. Moreover, this category includes both
reciprocal agreements (such as plea bargains and
commercial contracts) and unilateral decisions to give up
rights in order to protect one's own interests. Westen points
out that jurisdictions are legitimately more reluctant to
permit irrevocable prospective consent when the
commitment is nonreciprocal rather than reciprocal (252)."5
The proper analysis of retrospective consent, Westen
observes, is especially difficult to discern. Consider three of
Westen's examples. First, suppose S1 and Al are lovers.
One night, S1 awakes to discover that Al is (without any
prior agreement) having sexual intercourse with her.
Suppose she immediately embraces him, saying "This is
nice-we should do it this way again" (254). Second,
Westen recalls the famous scene from Gone with the Wind,
in which Rhett Buttler seizes his wife Scarlett O'Hara
during an argument and carries her struggling up to the
bedroom. In the morning, she is full of love for Rhett.
Westen points out that without regard to whether the
sexual intercourse that we can assume occurred was
consensual, Scarlett clearly did not factually consent at the
time to the physical assault of being carried up the stairs.
Third (and here Westen addresses an example from Joel
Feinberg), suppose S3 is violently attacked by A3, who is
45. See 252-53:
Significantly, jurisdictions tend to [permit irrevocable nonreciprocal
commitments] only with respect to subjects who reasonably believe
beforehand that, though they may retain some competence to assess their
own interests by the time of the event, their competence at that time will
be substantially diminished, whether because of fear .... psychological
pressure..., or other perceptual impairment ....
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then a stranger. She presses rape charges. But she
gradually falls in love with him, drops charges, and
concludes that if she had known him as well then as she
knows him now, she would have consented (255). We might
be inclined to deny that a harm has been done to S1, to
Scarlett (with respect to being carried, while struggling, up
the stairs), or (most controversially) to S3. Such cases,
Westen explains, demonstrate the paradoxical quality of
retrospective consent.
In the third example, Westen persuasively argues, the
retrospective feelings of S3 do not render the initial act
harmless; rather, although S3 now forgives A3, she may
still feel she was initially harmed. Perhaps she would have
acquiesced to what he did given what she now knows, but
this doesn't mean she did acquiesce (256). On the other
hand, Westen believes that the first two examples do
involve a form of retrospective consent that vitiates the
harm to the victim. In the case of Scarlett:
Scarlett appears not to feel assaulted at all. She seems to
feel that Rhett knew better than she did what she wanted
for herself. Like other people who are forced into situations
they later come to embrace, Scarlett seems pleased in
retrospect that Rhett disregarded her opposition, pleased
that Rhett did something that she now embraces as a
furthering of her interests, though she failed to realize it at
the time. (256)
This is a controversial analysis. It is defensible; as
Westen says, Scarlett can be analogized to a religious cult
member who is later grateful that his parents
deprogrammed him because they knew what was in his
interests better than he did (256). But we should also bear
in mind the concrete social context of this particular change
of heart. Some will plausibly object that the retrospective
acquiescence of a woman in Scarlett's situation should not
be treated as legal consent because she cannot reliably
judge what is in her own best interest, given the violent
and misogynistic pressures she continues to face.
(However, Westen's model can accommodate this
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objection-for example, by declaring that in some instances
of retrospective consent, S lacks sufficient competence, or
even, and more radically, by presuming lack of competence
in all such instances.)
Still, retrospective consent does pose a difficulty that
contemporaneous and even prospective consent do not: with
retrospective consent, there is a period of time (from the
time of x to the time of the retrospective consent) during
which S suffers wrongful harm (257). Yet this difficulty
dissolves, according to Westen, once S gives retrospective
consent. For at this point, he says,
the conduct is something that S chooses for herself and,
hence, something that not only is no longer a wrongful harm
to S but that is no wrongful harm ... at all. Thus, when
Scarlett decides after the fact that she wants Rhett to have
done to her what he did to her, Rhett's actions not only
cease to be a wrong to Scarlett, but cease to have been a
wrong to her. (257)
I'm not sure the problem can be dissolved so easily,
however. Understanding consent in this tenseless sense, as
"what S wants A to have done to her," simply papers over
the problem. S can now be glad that A did something that
she earlier opposed, but I don't think she can "want" or
"choose" something that she cannot influence, i.e., A's past
conduct. And this is not merely a linguistic point. Whether
S's later wishes and attitudes should always have priority
over her earlier ones in assessing her best interests or in
protecting her autonomy is an open question. At the very
least, ceteris paribus conditions need to be observed;
obviously a later preference that is less knowledgeable,
competent, or free than the earlier one might be ignored.
But the problem is deeper, for it seems to implicate
questions of personal identity over time. Thus, suppose the
"prior" person knows that she is likely later to embrace a
person who violently attacks her in a particular way
(perhaps based on an earlier experience), and is likely to
view the attack as not harmful at all; and suppose she
hates this about herself. If this happens again, and she
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does come to embrace the person, does her retrospective
consent serve her overall interests? Wouldn't we want to
permit her to precommit not to let this situation happen
again in the future? But wouldn't such a precommitment
plausibly serve her long-term interests and her autonomy?
A similar problem arises with Westen's analysis of the
objection that if we recognize retrospective consent, we
must recognize retrospective non-consent (where S
acquiesced at the time of x but at some later time rejects x,
such that she does not factually consent at the later time
4").
Westen points out that mens rea requirements protect A
here, but he concedes that from S's perspective,
retrospective non-consent "causes her to have suffered all
along the primary harm that the offense of non-consent
seeks to prevent" (260). Once again, however, it is fair to
ask why the later views of S necessarily control what was
in S's interests, and, indeed, to ask what it means to speak
of "'S's interests" simpliciter, over and above S's interests at
time one or at time two. And the answer, presumably, will
depend on the time frames, and on the reasons why the
later judgment might better represent S's long-term
interests. S's reflection for a few days is less likely to lead
to better judgment than her reflection over a few years.
And the judgment of a fifty-year-old might take priority
over that of his twenty-year-old predecessor, but the
judgment of a ninety-year-old might not deserve priority
over that of his fifty-year-old counterpart.
Westen points out that jurisdictions almost always
decline to give effect to retrospective consent, for a number
of plausible reasons (257). 47 But perhaps the substantive
46. I confess to some puzzlement with Westen's analysis here, given his
definition of factual consent. If at a later time S views x favorably, while at the
time she did not factually consent to it, how can the later view count as actual
factual consent, since S does not, at this later point in time, have an option to
acquiesce to x, a past event? This seems instead to be an instance of hypothetical
consent, where S is answering the counterfactual question, "Would I have
acquiesced to x at the time it occurred, if I then had had the feelings I now have
about A?"
47. Westen thoughtfully identifies three reasons. First, A will typically still
satisfy the mens rea requirement, even when S retrospectively consents. (But,
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problems I have mentioned are, or at least should be,
additional reasons for pause. (Westen also acknowledges
that jurisdictions have good reason to insist that
retrospective consent be a settled state of mind (262); but
this acknowledgement is in tension with his rejection of a
similar requirement for contemporaneous consent, as I
discuss above.)
E. Constructive Consent
As noted above, Westen identifies three categories of
consent that he considers "fictional," in the sense that they
impute legally valid consent to S even though she fails to
satisfy the standards of prescriptive consent: constructive
consent, "informed" consent, and hypothetical consent.
"Like all legal fictions," Westen claims, "fictions of
prescriptive consent can be replaced with functionally
equivalent rules that make no reference to consent" (272). I
agree with Westen that these three categories differ
significantly from standard prescriptive consent, but I
believe that he fails to appreciate their similarities to
prescriptive consent and why, in most instances, they all
still deserve the name "consent," and indeed could not be
adequately understood without reference to consent, at
least in the broad sense of the term. In this and the next
two sections, I will try to defend this objection.48
Westen points out, on rare occasions A might know or reasonably believe that S
will subsequently retrospectively consent, so in these cases, he should not be
guilty; in the other cases, however, he should be guilty only of attempt, since
retrospective consent eliminates the actus reus element of nonconsensual harm.)
Second, it is often difficult to distinguish true retrospective consent from S's
desire not to prosecute, or S's decision to forgive. And third, retrospective consent
is especially arbitrary because it could in principle occur at any time-the day
after, weeks later, even years later-and could, whenever S changes her mind
about whether she has experienced harm, repeatedly transform vitiated harm
into legally recognized harm and back again.
48. Westen does acknowledge that the fictions serve a function: the three
types possess common features, and "further some of the same values of personal
agency that underlie acts of prescriptive consent" (272). Still, he underemphasizes
or loses sight of this point in his later analysis, as we shall see.
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Let us begin with constructive consent-a rule of law
that, according to Westen, does not really depend on
consent at all, yet is framed in terms of consent.
(Sometimes, he points out, the overbroad term "implied
consent" is used for this idea. 9) One of Westen's example is
wonderfully colorful: the "Fastidious Football Fan" likes to
watch games but hates any physical contact with other
fans, and publicly so states while in the stands.
Nevertheless, the law will deem him to consent to such
contacts (322); indeed, remarkably, Westen discovers an
explicit Delaware criminal statute that so provides." As
another example, a jurisdiction that requires drivers
suspected of drunk driving to give blood alcohol tests might
justify this as based on the driver's "implied consent" or
"constructive consent" to the test (277). Even if it were
clear that a particular driver objected to this policy, the
policy might be upheld based on this "fictional" rationale.
Westen correctly asserts that applying a consensual
rationale in these circumstances stretches that rationale
beyond the rationale for prescriptive consent, and surely
cannot depend on the mere fact that the driver engaged in
some type of voluntary act. But he also acknowledges that
"the principle that underlies rules regarding compulsory
blood-alcohol testing shares a family resemblance to the
principle that underlies defenses of prescriptive consent"
(278-79). For the driver "voluntarily participated in a social
practice [of driving] in the expectation of benefiting from it
... the benefits of which depend upon the willingness of
participants to make certain personal sacrifices," including
49. Westen helpfully observes that "implied consent" can mean either
"imputed (or constructive) consent" or consent implied in fact. (This ambiguity
causes confusion in tort law, as well.) The latter type of consent simply refers to a
subset of prescriptive expressive consent, where S employs words or language
that, as conventionally understood, indirectly imply acquiescence-for example, a
patient says "start the anesthesia," implying that he is willing to begin the
procedure of having his tooth pulled (274).
50. "Any person who enters the presence of other people consents to the
normal physical contacts incident to such presence." Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 451
(1999), discussed at 322.
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obeying traffic rules and accepting blood-alcohol tests when
drunk driving is suspected (278).
Still, Westen treats prescriptive consent to an act x of
sexual intercourse as a more fundamental and more
genuine form of consent than constructive consent to a
social activity. In the latter case, although S consents to the
package, he does not consent to each of its elements; he
might prefer to be able to drive without being subject to
drunk-driving tests, or (in the case of the Fastidious Fan)
to watch sporting events without any risk of physical
contact from fellow fans.
But I think the contrast is overstated. After all, factual
consent to x, which is a precondition of actual (rather than
imputed) prescriptive consent, itself includes conditional
preference; and yet conditional preference, like constructive
consent, involves S's consenting to a package but not to
each of the package's elements. That is, when S
conditionally prefers x, a state of affairs including sex with
A, over y, a state of affairs excluding sex with A but
including some detriment that S would prefer to avoid, she
might consent to x quite reluctantly, simply to avoid that
detriment. (Suppose S consents to sex only to avoid A
breaking off the relationship.)
Moreover, in a surprisingly wide range of cases, sexual
contacts are better understood as instances of constructive
consent and not as instances of the narrower idea of
prescriptive consent. If S and A enthusiastically kiss at
time T1, and A unilaterally kisses S at time T2, only
moments later, this will be treated as constructive consent,
even if S then subjectively objects; but it will not be treated
as constructive consent if T2 occurs after they have broken
up, or if it occurs a year later (A and S having never
developed a relationship), and so forth. By the same token,
if A unilaterally follows the kiss at T1 with a slightly more
intimate gesture moments later, that, too, will most likely
fall within constructive consent;5' but the same is not true
51. But this might not be true in a jurisdiction or institution strictly applying
the "only 'yes' means 'yes' approach to any "escalation" of sexual intimacy (e.g.,
the rules that Antioch college applies).
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if A unilaterally follows the kiss with an aggressive act of
sexual penetration. Complex social conventions are very
important here in determining what forms of sexual
contact are considered acceptable instances of constructive
consent, even if they are not instances of factual consent.
And finally, I think we tend to assume too readily that
what S consents to is precisely x (say, the act of sexual
intercourse). Quite often, what S is really consenting to is a
package including x, but not to x itself. Of course, all cases
of conditional preference involve consent only to a package.
But even some cases of unconditional preference might best
be understood, not as consent precisely to x, but as consent
to what x will facilitate, or consent to a physical act very
similar to x. Thus, if S sleeps with A because she thinks
this will help maintain a relationship (but without any
threat by A to cut off the relationship if she does not), while
regretting that she has to have sex on this occasion, it
seems that she is consenting to the package including x,
but not unconditionally consenting to x itself. Or, if she
agrees to sex with a longtime partner, believing that this
will involve her being more active and aggressive than A
(which is their usual pattern), but on this occasion A
surprises her by taking a more active role, we might
conclude that she didn't expect or consent to precisely that
physical interaction, though after the fact, she has no
complaint. Again, in order to characterize this as an
instance of legal consent, we might need to rely on
constructive consent (or at least retrospective consent).
52
Whether we view a particular instance of constructive
consent as essentially dissimilar from prescriptive consent,
or instead as having a close family resemblance, does
matter. Consider a doctrine often conceptualized as
"implied" or constructive consent: the traditional marital
exemption from rape, which deemed a married woman to
consent to acts of violence by her husband, even if she did
not satisfy the criteria for consent that would have applied
52. Westen does recognize some difficulties in determining the requisite
specificity of "x" (see 195-201), but I believe that these problems are more
pervasive than he suggests.
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had she not been married to him. The exemption, Westen
points out, still survives in some form in many jurisdictions
(275). Westen claims that a jurisdiction can frame the
marital exemption in terms of actus reus without reference
to consent, by simply excluding married women from
eligible victims; or it can invoke a fiction of prescriptive
consent (275-76). But I believe that the choice of frame is
significant: by invoking the "fiction" of consent, and
explicitly deeming the married woman to consent, the
jurisdiction is asserting two things: first, that her situation
is normatively equivalent to that of a woman who actually
consents (thus, the imputation) insofar as both count as
legal consent; and second, that the reason for this
normative equivalence is a family resemblance between the
cases, i.e., a set of justifying principles that are at least
broadly similar and that fall within some plausible, generic
conception of consent.
To be sure, Westen is entirely correct in pointing out
that the marital exemption does not rely on actual proof
that the woman factually (prospectively) consents, in either
the attitudinal or expressive sense (323). Accordingly, he is
also correct that one cannot persuasively reject the marital
exemption merely on the ground that most married woman
do not actually factually consent in either sense to acts of
violence that would otherwise be rape. But I think he
misses part of the traditional rationale for the exemption,
which presumably was to consider a woman's decision to
marry as a voluntary waiver of a wide array of rights she
would otherwise have, in deference to her husband's
interests. Of course, this is not a rationale that we consider
legitimate today. But it is indeed a type of consensual
rationale, and this helps explain why treating the marital
exemption as an aspect of (rather than a completely
arbitrary "fiction" of) consent once seemed sensible.
Westen also notes a fallacious argument that some
courts employ to reject the marital exemption-the
argument that one can discredit the doctrine as a valid
form of legal consent simply by showing that it is a fiction
of prescriptive consent. Rather, Westen explains, courts
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must show that this is an unacceptable fiction, unlike, say,
the Delaware statute that treats a person as consenting to
the minor physical contacts incident to his entering the
presence of others (325). This is an important point.
Instances of constructive consent are much more prevalent
than is generally realized, as Westen's and my own
examples show. But the problem has received too little
attention and analysis. Accordingly, courts tend to rely on
ad hoc intuitions more than principle in distinguishing the
situations in which criminal liability will and will not be
excluded. (A very similar problem arises in tort law as well;
instead of articulating criteria of assumption of risk, courts
today often relegate the problem to the obscure multifactor
inquiry that the "limited duty of care" category requires.
5 3)
My endorsement of the vague concept of "family
resemblance" (a concept that Westen also acknowledges)
merely points in the direction of a more promising and
more principled analysis.
F. "Informed" Consent (Assumption of Risk)
Westen's second category of imputed consent is what
he calls "informed consent." Here, he is discussing what
courts in tort cases usually denominate assumption of
risk.5 4 These are cases in which S knowingly accepts a risk
of x but does not factually or legally consent to x itself
(280). Thus, suppose x is a harmful side-effect of surgery. If
53. See Simons, supra note 11, at 498-503.
54. In tort law, "informed consent" is more often used to describe the doctrine,
whether analyzed as battery or negligence, imposing tort liability for performing
a medical procedure p without obtaining the patient's adequate consent to p, in
the sense that the medical practitioner does not sufficiently inform the patient of
p's nature and risks. By contrast, Westen uses the phrase in a very special sense.
Westen is instead considering whether S consents to the harm x resulting from p
in either of two situations: (a) where S agrees to the medical procedure (or
physical contact) p, and would agree to p even if S realized that the risk of harm x
resulting from p was a certainty; (b) where S agrees to p, but would not agree to p
if S realized that the resulting risk of x was a certainty (282). In Westen's view,
(a) is a straightforward case of prescriptive consent to x, while (b) cannot be so
analyzed. Rather, if (b) does not result in criminal liability, it is because S has
given "informed consent" to x (or, I would say, has validly assumed the risk of x).
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S agrees to surgery, and would agree to surgery even if he
knew for certain that x would occur, then he prescriptively
consents to x. In effect, Westen treats this as a conditional
preference case: although S would surely prefer to obtain
the benefits of the surgery without the side effect, he is
willing to suffer the side effect to obtain the benefit, just as
S might be willing to have sex with A in order to keep a
relationship intact but might most prefer not to be faced
with the choice. By contrast, if S agrees to surgery but is
only willing to accept a small risk of x, not a certainty, in
order to secure the benefits of the surgery, then S does not
prescriptively consent to x. If his agreement is nevertheless
deemed to be legally sufficient consent, it must be an
instance of a different category of consent than prescriptive
consent.
Moreover, Westen continues, this different category, of
"informed" consent, demands a different analysis: S validly
consents to a risk of x only if he has sufficient knowledge of
the risk, and only if he is justified in taking the risk (283).
It is not socially justifiable to engage in street fighting, so a
brawler has no valid "informed consent" defense that the
other fighter agreed to the fight and knew of the risks of
serious injury; but it can be justifiable to engage in
competitive boxing, so a boxer indeed has a valid defense
that the other boxer knew of the risks of harm. The
justification, according to Westen, depends on a balancing
of the social benefits of the activity with the activity's risks
of harm. Westen concludes:
Ultimately, of course, rules of informed consent are legal
fictions. The fiction is that because persons prescriptively
acquiesce to risks of x, they also prescriptively acquiesce to x
itself. (283)
Westen is correct to point out that the prescriptive
consent and "informed consent" categories are distinct, and
demand distinct analysis. But I believe that he understates
the commonality between the two concepts, and
exaggerates by calling assumption of risk (or "informed
consent") a "fiction" of prescriptive consent.
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Let me begin with three preliminary observations.
First, notice an intriguing and surprising aspect of
Westen's analysis here: prescriptive consent, it turns out, is
a much broader concept than his initial definition might
suggest. And one consequence of this broad definition of
prescriptive consent is that "informed" consent need not be
invoked as frequently as one might have imagined.
Specifically, Westen indicates that prescriptive consent
to x does not require that S hope for or even expect x to
occur. Rather, it suffices that S would have preferred to
engage in the relevant act had S believed that x was
certain to occur (even if in fact, when she decided in favor
of the act, she believed the probability of x to be much less
than a certainty). For example, if S would prefer even the
certainty of suffering a broken finger to not playing a game
of high school football, then we need not rely on "informed"
consent to preclude the criminal liability of another player,
for S does give prescriptive consent (even if S believed and
hoped that the injury would not occur) (281).
This is a subtle and significant point. Still, even this
broader conception of prescriptive consent will very often
not be instantiated in surgical situations, or even in contact
sports. If x is a serious and permanent injury, of course, S
would almost never prefer x (nor any package of which x
was a part). And even if x is merely a physical contact or
minor injury, often S would not prefer x, if the preference
set is defined in a temporally limited way, as what S would
choose on that single occasion.55
In the second place, notice that the sports and medical
procedure fact patterns that Westen is addressing under
"informed" consent are quite different from most of the
sexual assault scenarios in which the issue of consent
55. Notice how sensitive the prescriptive consent characterization is to the
time dimension. If we ask, "Would you play a game of football knowing that an
unusually hard hit will happen?," the answer might be no; if we ask, "Would you
play a season of football, knowing that an unusually hard hit will occur at some
point during the season?," it might be yes. Indeed, if we ask, "Would you play
basketball for ten seconds, knowing that you will get knocked hard to the
ground?," the answer might be no; but if we ask, "Would you play a game knowing
that this will occur once during the game?," the answer might be yes.
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arises: S typically wants the benefits of the game, or the
procedure, and regrets that any risk of harm exists, while
both participants in sexual relations often unconditionally
desire sex. Nevertheless, some scenarios in the sexual
context are more analogous: when A places S in a
threatening or merely uncomfortable choice situation, S
might prefer to avoid sex yet choose it in order to avoid a
greater burden or obtain a benefit (such as continuation of
the relationship). Still, these last scenarios will not often
involve S acquiescing to a mere risk that (undesired) sex
will occur;56  after all, if S expresses agreement, it is
normally within A's power to complete the sexual act with
acquiescing S. Thus, assumption of a mere risk of x will
rarely be at issue when x is sexual intercourse or sexual
assault.
57
56. A very different set of issues arises when it is claimed that S, by dressing
provocatively, or walking alone in a city at night, or inviting a man to her room,
or agreeing to an act of prostitution, is assuming the risk of rape by A. For here,
S's prior conduct does not reflect or express any willingness that rape or even a
risk of rape occur. Put differently, A's conduct remains a wrong to her, even if she
realizes that her choices increase the risk of rape. Indeed, I believe that A's
conduct would be a wrong to her, and her decision to engage in the "risky"
conduct would not amount to a legal defense of consent, even if her mental state
and conduct would satisfy the standards of prescriptive consent (i.e., even if she
still would have walked alone at night or invited the man to her room had she
believed it virtually certain that she would thereby suffer a sexual assault). We
can account for these conclusions by saying that she is clearly entitled to freedom
of action in these situations, so even if she satisfies the criteria of factual consent,
she does not satisfy the condition of freedom required for legal consent. (In tort
law, courts recognize a "plaintiff no-duty" rule: the victim has no duty not to walk
alone at night, even if this conduct increases the risk of harm; accordingly, the
victim's conduct is ignored in any comparative fault judgment. See Ellen M.
Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 Colum.
L. Rev. 1413 (1999).)
57. Here are some rare examples:
(1) S is uninterested in sex tonight, and verbally agrees to sex only because
her partner A insists, and only because she believes that A will very probably lose
interest due to fatigue. Thus, she has acquiesced in only a small risk that A will
initiate sex.
(2) A threatens S with serious violence; S contemplates resisting, but
decides to acquiesce only because she thinks a passerby will very likely arrive in
time to prevent A from engaging in intercourse. Thus, she knowingly takes a
small risk that A will commit a rape.
But it is very doubtful that the legal validity of S's consent in these cases
should turn on whether she prescriptively consents to sex (i.e., she believes sex is
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Third, note that comparing consent to sexual assault
with consent to risks of harm in medical procedures and in
recreational or sporting activities to some extent compares
apples and oranges. The criminal law defense of consent to
rape or sexual assault focuses on whether S has acquiesced
to the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, and not
whether she has consented to the emotional or physical
harms (or the risks of such harms) that might result from
that contact. But the defense of consent to assault or
battery focuses on whether S has acquiesced to the harm
resulting from a medical procedure or from a physical
contact (or to the risk of such harm); for it is often not
disputed that S acquiesced to the procedure or the contact
itself, and in any event the crime of assault typically
prohibits, not merely causing a nonconsensual physical
contact, but bringing about a specified physical injury.
These distinct legal definitions of the prohibited actus reus
help explain why the issue of assumption of risk arises
much less often in sexual assault prosecutions.
(Nevertheless, lack of awareness of risk can become legally
relevant even in a sexual assault case if the jurisdiction
finds acquiescence to sex legally inadequate because S
lacks sufficient knowledge of the resulting risks from sex-
for example, when A has concealed or lied about his HIV-
positive condition.)
Nevertheless, although the characteristic factual
contexts of assumption of risk and prescriptive consent
differ, the underlying rationales for precluding criminal
liability in the two categories are quite similar, and much
more similar than Westen suggests. In each, minimal
conditions of competence, freedom, and knowledge are
required. And to a significant extent, the differences in
certain to occur, or she would consent had she so believed) or only assumes the
risk of x (she believes sex is much less probable). In the first scenario, S would
likely have legally consented regardless of whether she gave prescriptive consent
or instead only assumed the risk; and in the second scenario, S would
undoubtedly not have given legal consent regardless of the type of case. It is
difficult to conceive of a sexual assault case in which prescriptive consent would
not be recognized but (on otherwise similar facts) assumption of risk would be
recognized.
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criteria are only questions of degree, merely reflecting the
differences in the probability of the harm that S is willing
to accept. For reasons of space, I will merely sketch out this
argument.
In a case of assumption of risk, although S would not
consent to a certainty of x under the circumstances, he does
consent to some specified level of risk (say 5%) of x under
the circumstances; and we could easily define the requisite
criteria of assumption of risk analogously to the criteria of
prescriptive consent. Thus, we can say:
(1) S must unconditionally or conditionally prefer a 5%
risk of x, or must "indifferently" leave that choice of risk
to A;
(2) perhaps the law should consider whether S has
expressed that preference (see discussion of subjectively
expressed consent, above), or should consider how a
reasonable observer would understand the preference;
and
(3) the preference must satisfy specified criteria of
competence, knowledge, and freedom.
Of course, insofar as S is only willing to take this smaller
risk, it is much more likely that the risk will be considered
justifiable and thus that a knowing acceptance of the risk
will constitute legal consent. Agreeing to a 5% chance of
serious permanent injury in a wrestling match might be
justifiable and qualify as legal consent, while agreeing to a
100% probability might not and might not so qualify.58 But
the nature of the analysis is not fundamentally different in
the two contexts.
58. When Westen speaks of "justifiability" here, presumably he is indicating
that the choice fails to satisfy either the "freedom" or "competence" criterion, i.e.,
if the state determines that the risk is "unjustifiable," in effect it is concluding
that S's acceptance of such a risk is not sufficiently "free" (given the constraints
he faces) or is not sufficiently "competent" (given the very serious setback to his
welfare). Alternatively, perhaps Westen is addressing pure paternalistic
justifications, and would treat them outside his basic framework, as follows: even
if S's choice satisfies all the usual criteria of competence, knowledge, and freedom,
the state sometimes has an overriding interest in deciding what is best for S. On
either view, however, justifiability can be understood similarly when S consents
to x and when S consents to a risk of x.
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The rationales for permitting relatively low-level risk
taking include respect for autonomy and freedom of choice,
notwithstanding predictable and significant risks to the
welfare of the participants. In other words, with both high-
level and low-level risks, a critical question in judging
whether it is permissible for an actor to pose the risk, and
whether another actor's knowing acceptance of the risk
counts as legal consent, is whether the state has a
sufficient interest in overriding the actors' preferences.
What are the appropriate scope and limits of state
paternalism?
Accordingly, insofar as Westen might be suggesting
that a utilitarian cost-benefit judgment is required to
determine the permissible range of self-endangering
conduct, the suggestion is both descriptively inaccurate and
normatively incomplete if not erroneous. Or, to use
Westen's terminology, the concept of a risk's "social
benefits" is complex; it can and should include
considerations of autonomy. Prescriptive consent itself
need not depend on utilitarian analysis: to a considerable
extent, the law permits individuals to make autonomous
choices that arguably do not serve their own best interests,
or the best interests of society, and thus do not further
utility (however understood). For example, actors might
choose to engage in very "rough" sex that they will later
regret, or to have sex in order to prolong a psychological
unhealthy relationship, or to undergo cosmetic surgery that
they realize will cause very painful and prolonged side-
effects, or to participate in boxing or wrestling. For similar
reasons, the legal validity of assumption of risk does not
depend on a judgment that the choice is "reasonable" or
"justifiable" in the sense of promoting social utility. 9
59. For further discussion of this theme, see Simons, supra note 11, at 505.
Westen discusses my own account of assumption of risk in a footnote (299-
300 n.43). On that account, S assumes a risk in tort law if and only if S prefers
the risky alternative that A provided to the less risky alternative that A tortiously
failed to provide (and that most potential victims would prefer). So if passenger S
encourages driver A to speed, S would be precluded from tort recovery on my
"risk-preference" account, while passenger T who did not have or express such a
preference would be entitled to recover. Westen questions whether this account
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Finally, recall Westen's claim that ultimately
"informed" consent rests on a legal fiction that because S
consents to the risk of x, she gives prescriptive consent to x
itself. Here I must disagree. Assumption of risk or
"informed" consent is not a fiction at all. For no thoughtful
observer believes that by factually or legally consenting to
a risk of x, one necessarily factually or legally consents to x
itself. Rather, the decision to treat both as legally valid
forms of consent is an obvious case of the law having (good
or bad) reasons for treating one form of consent the same
for purposes of criminal liability as another.
Consider Westen's helpful definition of "fiction,"
provided in another section of the book:
should apply to criminal law, and indeed seems to question the validity of the
account in any context: he asserts that the risks that A offers to S are either
unjustifiable or justifiable, so S's personal risk preference should be irrelevant.
But I believe that intermediate categories exist, where the activity offered
by A is neither justified for all who encounter it, nor unjustified for all who
encounter it. If the activity is skating on a very rough ice skating surface, perhaps
this is wrongful to offer to most skaters, but not to those skaters who fully prefer
this because it provides an extra challenge or because they have unusual skill.
Put differently, traditional assumption of risk could be recharacterized as a
selective no-duty rule: in the above example, A owes a duty of care to T but not to
S. See Simons, supra note 11, at 500.
On the other hand, it might also be true, as Westen suggests, that the
criteria for barring tort recovery on the basis of assumption of risk properly differ
from the criteria for precluding criminal liability on that basis. Perhaps criminal
law should ordinarily look at assumption of risk wholesale, not retail, treating A's
actions as unjustifiable or justifiable, period, without regard to S's preferences. In
my example, if S encourages A to speed, S can't recover in tort in states that take
traditional assumption of risk seriously. But in criminal law, perhaps we should
just determine whether A is criminally negligent or reckless in subjecting S to
this risk, whether or not S agrees to it in some sense; for in criminal law, we are
concerned with A's responsibility to the public, while in tort, we are also or
instead concerned with S's right to obtain relief from A. (Even if, on the facts, A
endangered only S, criminal law can legitimately be concerned with punishing A.)
Indeed, precisely because traditional tort assumption of risk often involves A
posing unjustifiable risks to some (but not to others who consent to the risk), A's
conduct is often appropriately subject to criminal regulation, even if those others
are not legally entitled to tort damages if injured.
Another illustration of the difference between tort and criminal law
approaches to these issues is the treatment of injuries from illegal fights. Some
states provide that even participants in illegal fights who are subject to criminal
prosecution are not subject to tort liability, because of the choice of the victim to
participate.
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A fiction is a misrepresentation, a statement of something
that, on its own premises, is necessarily false. In expressing
a legal fiction, a speaker consciously or unconsciously refers
to the absence of a certain fact as the occurrence of that very
fact. (292)
In this sense, assumption of risk is hardly a fiction. It is a
straightforward idea, easily understood. And its definition
and analysis can be perfectly parallel to the definition and
analysis of prescriptive consent.6 °
G. Hypothetical Consent
Westen describes hypothetical consent as a category of
imputed consent in which "S would have prescriptively
consented to x or to a risk of x ifS had had the opportunity,
which S did not" (284). He points out that the idea is used,
though somewhat differently, both in moral and political
theory, and in criminal law. In political theory, consent "is
at most a conceptual device for formulating new criminal
offenses, not an interpretive device for giving meaning to
the term 'consent' under existing offenses" (285). And
Westen nicely summarizes the precise assumptions of
criminal law's version of the concept as applied to a subject
who might have once been competent but at the time of x is
not.e"
Westen explains that medical treatment of
unconscious or incompetent patients is often justified by
this type of hypothetical consent, which (unfortunately) is
frequently identified by the unhelpful label "implied
consent." The difficult questions here are when an
60. Westen does acknowledge that both assumption of risk and prescriptive
consent rules enhance S's autonomy by immunizing A from criminal liability
(284). This recognition is hard to reconcile with his assertion that assumption of
risk is a fiction.
61. The assumptions include: considering everything known about S including
her distinct values and idiosyncrasies; imagining that for a brief moment, S
regains her competence (or gains new competence) and decides how she wishes to
be treated when her incompetence reoccurs; and supposing that S has the benefit
of the information about her condition that those responsible for her welfare now
have (285).
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advanced directive not to treat will negate hypothetical
consent, and what type of presumptions should be
employed, e.g., in favor of life-saving treatment.
Hypothetical consent is, of course, distinct from actual
consent. As Ronald Dworkin observed in the context of
political justification, "[A] counterfactual consent is not
some pale form of consent. It is no consent at all."62 And one
might therefore expect Westen to emphasize the fictional
and misleading nature of hypothetical consent.
Interestingly enough, he does not. In response to others'
objection that hypothetical consent is a dangerous legal
fiction, Westen argues that it is indeed a fiction, but it need
not be a dangerous or misleading one. Westen
acknowledges that determining hypothetical consent
requires a counterfactual inquiry that is sometimes
difficult to answer. Nevertheless, "a counterfactual
statement is not a fiction because it is not invariably false,
and it does not refer to a thing by anything other than
what it is, namely, a counterfactual" (292). What is fictional
about hypothetical consent, Westen continues, is that it
invokes counterfactual facts that plausibly are true of S
(that she would have consented) in order to attribute to S
facts that could not possibly be true (that S actually did
give prescriptive consent) (293). But this is not a dangerous
fiction, Westen believes, insofar as it is not misleading. And
there is indeed widespread recognition that incompetent
and unconscious persons do not actually choose medical
treatment for themselves.
I largely agree with Westen's analysis here, but I
would give greater emphasis to the value of at least certain
legal fictions. One of the reasons that this particular fiction
is not misleading is that it is an appropriate, persuasive
analogy. To be sure, even a completely arbitrary fiction
need not be misleading. If we decided to call A's justifiable
self-defense against S an instance of S's "consent to
defensive force," and if everyone understood that the new
label was merely that, then the fiction would not be
62. R.M. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 278 (1985).
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misleading. But it would also be pointless. And the legal
fictions of consent that Westen identifies do have a point: to
identify different types of consensual behavior that deserve
equivalent legal treatment.
Westen does recognize that fictions of Y can be
beneficial in the way I have suggested, by revealing the
underlying values that Y and the fiction of Y have in
common. He indicates that the fiction of hypothetical
consent is valuable because it "convey[s] what the decision
regarding [an incompetent patient] shares with decisions
regarding competent patients on life support, namely, that
both are entitled to be treated as much as possible as
agents of their own well-being" (293). Westen's
acknowledgement has wider significance: in most of the
imputed consent contexts that he addresses, the argument
against criminal liability rests on similar values of
respecting S's autonomy and agency, and protecting A from
criminal sanction when his actions demonstrate such
respect.
63
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL CLAIMS
Perhaps the most striking and provocative claims in
the book are these (related) assertions:
(1) A force requirement is largely coextensive with a
simple non-consent requirement. Accordingly, force is
essentially a gratuitous concept, and the controversy
63. In his conclusion to the imputed consent chapter, Westen wonders why
states do not use direct legislative language, rather than fictions of consent, to
address constructive, informed, and hypothetical consent; and he offers a
proposed statute that would embody this direct approach. In his view, the direct
approach would lead to a narrower definition of non-consent than the current
approach, under which courts often create fictions of non-consent to encompass
these categories, in the absence of explicit statutory provisions (296).
Although I am not so sure that Westen's approach would necessarily
provide a narrower definition of non-consent, it would indeed be an improvement
in clarity and fair notice. In this regard, it would be similar to what we see in
modern sexual assault statutes, which carefully distinguish which types of
incompetence, threat, and coercion vitiate consent, and which are therefore an
improvement over older, more opaque statutes that courts sometimes treated,
through interpretation, as reaching very similar results.
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over whether to eliminate the force requirement is based
on a fundamental conceptual confusion.
(2) Resistance requirements are themselves merely
logical corollaries of wrongful force and non-consent
requirements, and therefore are not problematic; at
least, they are no more problematic than the force and
non-consent requirements to which they correspond. But
for this reason, explicit resistance requirements are also
gratuitous, since they are no more than a logical
implication of wrongful force requirements.
Although there is a germ of truth to both claims, the claims
are also misleading, for they fail to capture what is
distinctive about contemporary objections to force and
resistance requirements, as we shall see.
A. Force
As noted above, Westen employs the term "wrongful
force" to encompass all wrongful threats that illegitimately
pressure S to acquiesce in x. This is a very broad
understanding of the term, for it encompasses such varied
examples as a high school principal's conditioning a
student's graduation on submitting to sex, or (in a
jurisdiction that forbids this) a boyfriend using mere
emotional pressure to induce consent.s4 It is much wider
than what was undoubtedly the original meaning of the
term in traditional rape statutes, namely, an immediate
threat of significant physical violence.
It might be defensible to employ the term in a very
specialized sense, and some jurisdictions do use the term
surprisingly broadly,65 though it certainly, seems that the
term "wrongful threat" would be more accurate.6 But the
64. See Commonwealth v. Meadows, 553 A.2d 1006, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989), discussed in Schulhofer, supra note 27, at 91-93, 121-24.
65. See 31 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3101 (2006) (defining forcible compulsion as
"[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological
force, either express or implied").
66. Insofar as Westen also means to encompass the rare instance of what he




more important difficulty is with how Westen evaluates the
legal relevance of wrongful "force," as he broadly construes
the term.
Westen points out that the analysis of wrongful "force"
to acquiesce can sometimes seem paradoxical. What if S
subjectively consents to be pressured to subjectively
acquiesce to x? (202). The answer, Westen persuasively
argues, depends on the jurisdiction's particular version of
legal paternalism. All jurisdictions, he notes,
unconditionally prohibit some pressures on acquiescence no
matter how much S welcomes them (e.g., pressuring a
masochist into the choice of sex and being murdered or
seriously maimed); while all only conditionally prohibit
other types of pressures, i.e., they prohibit certain
pressures only if S does not welcome them (e.g., a college
wrestler legitimately employing physical force in order to
induce the other wrestler into a physically vulnerable
position).
But Westen's further analysis of the force requirement
is more questionable. The debate over whether women are
better protected by laws against force or against non-
consent, he says, "rests on false conceptual premises" (208),
for either "force" or "non-consent" can easily incorporate the
jurisdiction's view of when pressures on subjective
acquiescence are wrongful.67 At the same time, he decries
as confused the popular belief that controversial questions
about force requirements can be eliminated by instead
making it a crime to act without S's consent (232).68 Westen
67. Westen mentions two exceptional cases, where he concedes that "non-
consent" must be used in lieu of (or at least as part of the definition of) "force":
(1) Where A uses compulsion to achieve intercourse against S's wishes or
acquiescence (for here, since compulsion that S factually consents to is not
unlawful (e.g., a disabled S), we must use the language of non-consent to
identify when compulsion is indeed unlawful); and
(2) Where A employs a threat, but the threat is only conditionally criminal
(e.g., the state permits a threat of moderate pain such as a spanking if but
only ifS prescriptively consents to it) (210).
68. In his introduction, Westen refers to the debate over the best way to
reform rape law between Susan Estrich (arguing for a revitalized conception of
consent) and Catherine MacKinnon (arguing for prohibitions on force and
rejecting the use of the concept of consent). Here, too, he objects that the
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asserts that this belief is incorrect because when S has
been pressured into sex, questions of force are not
independent of legally valid consent; they are constitutive
of legal consent (232). Even without an explicit force
requirement, in other words, a jurisdiction would have to
determine, as part of its non-consent requirement, what
pressures to acquiesce are illegitimate.
Westen is correct to underscore that in many cases,
force and non-consent are closely related, or even
interchangeable. But he overstates the relationship. In the
first place, as an historical matter, the movement in many
jurisdictions from a "force" requirement to a less
demanding "non-consent" requirement has actually meant
a substantive change from requiring that the pressure on S
take the form of a violent threat to requiring much less
(e.g., the "'no' means 'no'" approach, or counting as
wrongful various types of nonviolent threats such as
retaliatory or coercive deprivation of legal rights or loss of
certain important benefits). Of course, Westen wants to use
"force" to encompass pressures other than violence, but to
that extent, he misrepresents what at least some advocates
mean to accomplish by replacing a "force" requirement with
a broader "non-consent" requirement.
Second, Westen's approach cannot really explain the
modern approaches that count A's actions as sexual assault
when he does not pressure S with any type of threat yet
proceeds to engage in intercourse despite S's non-
acquiescence. In both the "'No' means 'no' and "Only 'yes'
means 'yes' approaches, A need not make any explicit
threat or impose any explicit type of pressure; the very
point of these approaches is to recognize the woman's right
to decide and to forbid A's action if she affirmatively
indicates non-acquiescence, or if she has not affirmatively
indicated acquiescence.
Westen does have a reply, but I think it is an
unpersuasive instance of definitional fiat. If a jurisdiction
difference between the approaches is rhetorical, not substantive, and that it is
'normative confusion" to think otherwise (3).
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treats "no" as "no" even in the absence of any other kind of
force or pressure (such as a threat of violence, or of another
detriment or of loss of a benefit), then, according to Westen,
the jurisdiction is treating a man who continues to proceed
with intercourse despite verbal objection as using "force" in
the sense of "illegitimate pressure." For he is required to
stop when she says "no"; so by continuing, he is necessarily
improperly pressuring S. 69 (And the "Only 'yes' means 'yes'
approach would be analyzed similarly.)
But stretching the meaning of "force" this far is quite
misleading. Even the broadest sense of "force" requires a
"threat": A must put S to a choice of x or something else
(call it "y") and S must submit to x in order to avoid y. Yet
this often is not an apt description of the situation and of
S's state of mind when she says "no" but A persists until he
has had intercourse. What S wants is simply not-x, i.e., not
having intercourse. To say that she has chosen to acquiesce
to x in order to avoid the threat of y misrepresents the
phenomenology of her state of mind concerning her
submission. She need not feel that she will be made worse
off if she does not submit, in order to feel violated by his
persisting. To be sure, if S persistently and sincerely says
"no" while A keeps proceeding, it is possible that she is
submitting because of an implicit threat of something
else-of violence, or of some other illegitimate burden. But
she also might simply be unwilling to have sex. In short, a
jurisdiction that wishes to criminalize A's conduct here
should be entitled to do so even if A's conduct cannot
plausibly be characterized as imposing a threat.
70
69. In his words:
Some jurisdictions regard the pressures that actors bring to bear upon
women to induce them to submit to sexual intercourse despite their saying
"no" as wrongful pressures. Others do not. In jurisdictions that do, actors
are guilty of sexual intercourse by force and without consent. In
jurisdictions that do not, actors are guilty neither of using force nor of
having sexual intercourse without consent. (344)
70. Nor can Westen escape this objection by characterizing the physical
conduct intrinsic to the act of intercourse itself (such as penetration) as wrongful
"force," for as Westen persuasively argues: "The wrongful force with which the
law of rape is concerned, including wrongful force in the form of physical contact,
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Interestingly enough, at the very end of the book,
Westen objects to the use of "force" to describe instances of
non-consent that are due, not to the actor's lack of
sufficient freedom to warrant treating factual consent as
legal consent, but to the actor's lack of sufficient
competence or knowledge: "It would be simpler and more
perspicuous to start and finish with legal consent as the
controlling standard" (346). Indeed it would. But it would
also be more perspicuous to treat the situation I have
described, of a passive victim who submits to sex despite
her opposition, as nonconsensual simply because legal
consent requires the actor to treat a "no" (or even lack of a
"yes") seriously, on pain of criminal liability, and not
because her submission legitimately qualifies as induced by
wrongful "force."
Now Westen has another possible reply: in this
scenario, S has not given factual consent, so a jurisdiction
can easily decide that legal consent is also lacking. But I do
not believe that this response is available to him, given his
view of factual consent. In this situation, jurisdictions that
believe "'no' always means 'no,"' or "only 'yes' means 'yes',"
want to treat A's conduct as sexual assault or rape even ifS
knows that she might have an effective alternative to
submitting to sex with A-for example, pushing him away,
or screaming at him, or simply walking out the door. And
yet, on Westen's view, her conditional preference for
submission over these alternatives means that she
factually consents to sex. (I will say more about this below.)
And, finally, since (as I have argued) her preference cannot
plausibly be viewed as induced by a wrongful threat, the
conclusion must be that she has given both factual and
legal consent. (The only other arguments available to
Westen here that might preclude considering S's factual
consent to be legal consent-that S lacks "competence" to
consists of wrongful pressure to acquiesce to the physical contact of sexual
intercourse, not the physical act of sexual intercourse itself' (229). But cf. In re
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (controversially holding that the statutory




consent, or that she is the subject of "compulsion"-are
dubious on their face.71 )
Still, perhaps Westen's model could account for a
jurisdiction's choice to impose criminal liability in this
scenario if he did not characterize as factual consent a
decision to submit to sex rather than take advantage of
opportunities to avoid sex. The latter characterization, of
course, directly relates to how a resistance requirement
should be understood, and when, if ever, it is normatively
acceptable. Accordingly, I turn to Westen's controversial
analysis of that doctrine.
B. Resistance
Westen frames the resistance question carefully and
elegantly. When A wrongfully threatens S, he presents her
with three options:
(1) to submit to an act of sexual intercourse that she abhors,
(2) to refuse to submit and suffer the very harm, e.g., a
brutal beating, with which she is wrongfully threatened, or
(3) to resort to evasions by which she can successfully avoid
both the burden of unwanted sexual intercourse and the
burden of any of the threatened harms from which the
statute seeks to protect her. (210)
In Westen's view, the resistance requirement in (3) is
simply a logical corollary of the wrongful threat
requirement in (2), in the following sense. Suppose the
jurisdiction says that A's threat is wrongful (for the
purposes of its rape statute) if and only if it is a threat of
71. "Compulsion" doesn't work because Westen defines it narrowly as physical
force that S is unable to prevent. In the passive victim scenario, this need not be
the case.
But can Westen rely on a "soft" compulsion argument? Perhaps he can
argue that legal consent is also lacking if S, while retaining some ability to
prevent A from securing x, has less capacity to prevent x than the law entitles her
to have. But this reformulation of the "compulsion" element seems arbitrary. The
policy arguments in favor of "'No' means 'no'" or "Only 'yes' means 'yes" need not
rely on A overwhelming S's will, yet that is what any "compulsion" approach
presupposes.
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serious bodily injury or death. If S responds to a threat of
death (2) by choosing to submit (1), when she could have
chosen an evasion or form of resistance (3), what is critical
is what harm she (believes that she) would have suffered if
she had chosen resistance. If by resisting (3) she would
have been met with serious bodily harm, then there is no
duty to resist, for imposing such a duty would require her
to suffer the very harm from which the rape statute
protects her. But if by resisting she would only have
suffered moderate or lesser bodily injury, then she has
declined to choose an option that would have permitted her
to avoid both unwanted sex (1) and the enumerated harm
(2) from which the statute sought to protect her. Of course,
one might object that a statute such as this imposes too
onerous a duty to resist. But, according to Westen, this
really amounts to an objection that the statute should not
impose such a narrow definition of wrongful threat. So if a
jurisdiction does not want to require a duty to resist if this
would lead to even moderate injury, then the jurisdiction
should also require, as its criterion of wrongful threat, that
A not put S to the choice of intercourse and even moderate
injury.
This argument has superficial appeal. If true, it would
also dramatically change the way we view and argue about
resistance requirements.12 It would mean that "utmost-
resistance" requirements are just as acceptable (or
unacceptable) as the wrongful threat requirements that the
jurisdiction imposes (212-14). It would also mean that "no-
duty-to-resist" rules are just as defensible as the
corresponding wrongful threat requirements (214-17). And
it would demonstrate, on the one hand, that resistance
requirements in a sense are gratuitous, for they need not be
72. Westen is also deliberately provocative in his description of the actual
operation of the traditional "utmost-resistance" rule. He states that the rule did
not really require utmost resistance: it only applied to those with capacity to
resist, who did not think countermeasures futile, and who could use
countermeasures without risking death or great bodily injury (212). Whether this




specified independently of definitions of what count as
wrongful threats; and on the other hand, that resistance
requirements in a sense are inevitable, because any
plausible definition of wrongful threat will only protect S
against certain types of harm, and thus will in effect
require a woman to "resist" if in doing so she can avoid that
type of harm. For example, suppose it is a wrongful threat
to induce acquiescence by any threat of physical harm, but
not by a threat to take an inexpensive piece of property. If
A wrongfully threatens to slap S if she does not have sex,
and if she knows she could easily walk out the door to
safety but also realizes that this would cause A never to
return S's inexpensive ring, her submitting to sex instead
would satisfy legal consent.
But the logical corollary argument is inadequate and
in an important respect fallacious. Let me explain why,
with the following four points.73
1. An initial issue is terminological: what should count
as resistance? Should it include anything that S could do or
say to prevent x (running away, screaming, pressing a car
alarm, merely saying "no"), or only S's efforts, by physical
confrontation, to prevent x (pushing A away, fighting
back)? Westen defines resistance in the first, extremely
broad way. This is problematic for some of the same
reasons that defining "force" extremely broadly is
problematic. Among other things, it means that his
criticism of others' views of resistance is sometimes
misplaced; while his criticism is apt if they are employing
the broad view (and indeed, the phrase "verbal resistance"
73. I am also unpersuaded by Westen's criticism of the argument that
resistance can at least give notice of non-consent to A (217-19). Even if one
accepts his "corollary" view (that resistance risking harm up to a certain
magnitude is required if a threat of harm of that corresponding magnitude is
required), the notice argument has at least some weight. It is sometimes difficult
for A to know why S submitted, or whether she honestly felt threatened by A; if
she resists, these things are easier to know. The law would not be "contradicting
itself' (cf. 218) in wanting especially clear proof of threats, or of S's honest belief
that she has been threatened, or of A's realization that S so believes, though of
course there are also very strong reasons not to elevate this slight evidentiary
benefit to a legal requirement.
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is sometimes employed in the rape debate), it is not apt if,
as is sometimes the case, they are employing the narrower
view.74 Good pragmatic reasons also support the narrower
interpretation. Whether a woman must say "no" or else be
deemed to have factually consented is an important and
controversial question. Because it is controversial, while
the lack of a stringent duty to resist physically is not, it
would make sense to restrict the term "resistance" to
physical steps taken by the victim to ward off the man's
advances.
2. The second point is this. The logical corollary
argument is simply false: it reflects an understanding of
the duty to resist that a jurisdiction might have very good
reason to reject, and it fails to capture features of a duty to
resist that a jurisdiction might have very good reason to
find problematic. Specifically, a jurisdiction might not
consider legally equivalent the situation in which S
"resists" (in the broad sense) and thereby expects to suffer
harm Y, and the situation in which S submits to sex in
order to avoid the wrongful threat of a harm Z that is
claimed to be equivalent to Y. One reason it might not
consider the situations legally equivalent is because a
meaningful comparison of harms Y and Z is often quite
difficult. For Westen's very broad definitions of force and
resistance create a serious incommensurability problem.
Suppose it is wrongful force for A to threaten to give S a
lower grade than she deserves, or to deny her graduation
from high school, if she will not have sex with him. And
suppose S knows she could "resist" and prevent sex by
reporting A to the school board, or by slapping A as he
initiates sexual activity. I have no idea whether the state's
imposition of a duty on A not to obtain sex by wrongful
"force" threatening these kinds of harms (lower grade,
nongraduation) has as its corollary that S must take these
preventive actions despite the harms S will thereby suffer
(the burdens of having to report A, or of having to




physically strike A). Which harms are greater? Perhaps the
rough idea is that S is required to employ forms of
resistance that are less burdensome for her to undertake
than the burden that she would suffer if A were to make
good his wrongful threat; but the legislative definition of
wrongful threats hardly clarifies what counts as a lesser
burden.75
There is a second, more fundamental reason why a
jurisdiction might choose not to impose on S a duty to resist
if this would entail her suffering harm Y1, even in cases
where Y1 can more easily be compared with the harm Y2
that A is forbidden from threatening to impose in order to
induce her acquiescence. (Suppose a case in which Y2 is
physical harm or violence threatened by A, and Y1 is
physical harm or violence that S expects to suffer if she
physically resists.) The reason is this: imposing a duty to
resist, insofar as it demands affirmative action by S at a
moment when she is under imminent violent threat, is
requiring something quite extraordinary of a crime victim.
Even a jurisdiction that requires a threat of a relatively
high degree of violence in order for A's threat to be
wrongful might also understandably choose not to require
any affirmative conduct by S to resist the threat, or at
least, no affirmative conduct by which she might expect to
suffer any injury. (Presumably this is one of the reasons
why rape reformers have tried to abolish the resistance
requirement. 6 )
75. Or consider the facts of the famous case of State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720
(Md. 1981). In Rusk, a jury might have concluded that the victim was implicitly
threatened with physical harm when Rusk grabbed her car keys and insisted on
her coming up to his apartment. But Pat did have another option: to run away
into the unfamiliar neighborhood at night. If she believed that fleeing would
expose her to an equivalent risk of harm from an unknown stranger, does that
count as legally equivalent to the threat of harm from Rusk? Alternatively,
suppose she conceded that the risk of physical harm from fleeing was much less
than the risk of such harm from staying with Rusk; rather, the main risk from
fleeing was simply that she would be lost, fearful and disoriented in an unfamiliar
place at night, and would have great difficulty getting home. Is this a lesser,
equivalent, or greater burden than what she expects to suffer if she does not flee
(and does not submit to sex)?
76. Another reason, to be sure, is undoubtedly a desire to reduce the requisite
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Thus, suppose a jurisdiction provides that wrongful
force means threats of physical injury. The jurisdiction
might at the same time plausibly conclude that S need not
engage in any form of physical resistance, even if she could
avoid any physical injury to herself by shoving A and
running away, or by stabbing A with a knife. Even a
jurisdiction that limits "wrongful force" to threats of serious
physical injury or death might conclude that requiring S to
resist if she knows she could do so by suffering "only" less-
than-serious injury would place too great an obligation on a
victim-"too great" in terms of what can realistically be
expected in such a stressful and extraordinary
circumstance, and in terms of what can legitimately be
expected of a person in order to avoid an otherwise coercive
choice. (Indeed, in cases where she can protect herself only
by causing serious injury to A, but where she does not
expect to suffer any harm if she chooses to harm A, it would
certainly be understandable if a jurisdiction decided both
(1) to permit S to be merciful rather than stand on her
right to self-defense, and also (2) not to treat the merciful
choice as precluding a rape conviction.) Or, at the other end
of the spectrum, suppose a jurisdiction defines wrongful
force as any threat of aggressive physical contact. And
suppose the following case: A threatens to push S onto a
bed if she does not submit; S believes that slapping the
man hard on the face is the only sure way to stop him; but
she is also sure (given what she knows about his fearful
response to such an act) that he will not then retaliate with
violence. Why should she be required to resort to even a
mild form of violence?
level of violence that A must threaten in order for his threat to be wrongful, or a
desire to eliminate a threat requirement from rape law altogether. To this extent,
Westen's "corollary" approach is a valuable reminder of the possible (but not
necessary) relationship between force and resistance requirements. Still, even a
jurisdiction that abolishes the threat requirement might want to impose
aggravated punishment on sexual assault accomplished by threat of serious
violence, and it still should be an open question and not merely a question of
logical relevance whether a duty to resist should also be required for conviction of




In this and other cases, a jurisdiction might have good
reasons for rejecting any duty to resist. And it might
conclude that the evil of having to resist and thereby suffer
(or even inflict) a particular harm is a qualitatively distinct
type of harm or wrong from the evil of directly suffering an
otherwise similar harm from A as a result of A making
good his threat.77
An analogy is a robbery victim who could resist and
thereby expect minor force (less than what the robber is
threatening) in order to avert the harm. We obviously
would not view the victim as consenting to the robbery,
even in a minimal, factual sense, simply because he had
this opportunity and failed to choose it; nor would a duty to
resist in this way logically follow from a statutory
requirement that the robbery be accompanied by a threat of
greater-than-minor force.
Accordingly, even if we understand resistance broadly,
as encompassing acts other than physical resistance
against A's advances, the factual consent choice set should
not be understood to encompass S's option of taking
affirmative action to resist A. And this exclusion of
resistance from the conditional preference choice set is
consistent with Westen's general treatment of factual
consent: just as he sensibly builds some minimal standards
of competence and knowledge into factual consent, so he
should build in some minimal constraints on the choice set
77. Indeed, the failure of the "logical corollary" argument also means that, in
theory, a jurisdiction could choose the converse approach from the one we have
been considering: a jurisdiction might decide to impose a more stringent duty to
resist than the corresponding definition of wrongful threat entails. In cases of
physical violence, to be sure, this is exceedingly unlikely. If aggravated rape
requires A to threaten S with moderate or serious physical injury, it is difficult to
see how the jurisdiction could plausibly justify requiring S to resist if this would
cause her to risk moderate physical injury or worse. Still, such a jurisdiction
would not be literally "contradicting itself," as Westen argues (219). For imagine a
much weaker threat requirement: criminalizing the threat of any unwanted
emotional harm, including the threat of social embarrassment. And suppose the
state also requires S to actively resist by loudly proclaiming "no" even in a
situation (such as proximity to the public) where this will cause S significant
embarrassment, in order to ensure that A has notice of nonacquiescence or that
the proof of S's nonacquiescence is clear. This might still be bad policy, but it
would not be self-contradictory.
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(at least, insofar as many jurisdictions would indeed
recognize such constraints).
It is especially important to exclude S's option of
affirmative action from the choice set when A's conduct
involves threats other than violence, or involves persistence
in the face of a clear "no." Otherwise, one is compelled to
draw the awkward and implausible conclusion that when S
persistently and vehemently says "no" to A's advances but
ultimately submits, she has factually consented simply
because she could have chosen another option that would
be effective (such as striking A or screaming). Westen
indeed draws that conclusion:
If [S] ... appears to realize that saying "no" will not change
her partner's mind and to be consciously refraining from
resorting to more emphatic forms of resistance at her
disposal that might succeed, she ... factually "consents" to
sexual intercourse in mind as well as in expression, because
she subjectively prefers sexual intercourse to the
alternatives to which she believes she could resort, and she
makes her preference manifest. (87)78
3. At the same time, if a jurisdiction decides as a
matter of policy to impose a duty to resist, it can easily do
so, by explicitly incorporating such a duty within the
definition of legal consent. For example: "S shall be deemed
78. To be sure, Westen's approach can still criminalize A's conduct in this
scenario, but I believe that he must frame this as an instance of factual consent
failing to satisfy either the jurisdiction's requirement of sufficient competence, or
its requirement of sufficient freedom, for legal consent. Or we would need a
separate exception to the effect that certain forms of resistance are not required,
even if the overall factual consentlegal consent framework would otherwise treat
the case as one of legal consent. Either solution seems ad hoc. Would it not be
more perspicuous to exclude physical resistance in the first instance from the
choice set for factual consent?
Westen does ameliorate the difficulty with his "logical corollary" approach
to resistance in one important respect. He would say that S does not factually
consent if in the face of a threat, and aware of an option to resist, she simply
panics or is in an emotionally frozen state of mind; for she has not actually made
a decision not to resist (219). Still, if she does actually decide that it is better, all
things considered, not to resist, she will indeed be understood to have given
factual consent.
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to legally consent if she acquiesces to x, even in response to
a wrongful threat, if she also (1) knows she could have
prevented x by employing minor force or by employing
verbal resistance and (2) knows that these methods are
likely to be effective." And if the legislature means to adopt
a duty to resist that is precisely coextensive with the
definition of wrongful force, then it can so define element
(1).1 9 Among other things, this approach would have the
benefit of highlighting the legislative decision to impose
this special affirmative duty on a rape victim, rather than
concealing the duty by articulating a general definition of
wrongful force or threat and then simply assuming that the
victim's duty to resist directly follows from that definition.
4. I have been considering cases in which A threatens
S with physical violence, and S has some ability to resist or
prevent such violence. But another important category of
cases involves A actually using physical force to overpower
S. In some cases, which Westen denominates "compulsion,"
A overpowers S completely. But how should we analyze
cases in which A tries to overpower S, yet S knows that she
has, or might have, the ability to avoid the harm? In this
scenario, too, Westen's analysis is deficient. For in these
cases, Westen must (and does) say that A factually
consents to the harm, because she evidently prefers to
submit to sex than to resist (229). And once again, in order
to make sense of a jurisdiction's decision to criminalize
such conduct, he must employ an ad hoc solution, such as
characterizing S as lacking sufficient "competence" or
"freedom."
79. Thus, if the legislature defines wrongful force for purposes of rape as a
threat of serious bodily injury or death, then it could define (1) as any preventive
means that do not expose the victim to a significant risk of serious bodily injury
or death.
2006] 645
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:577
CONCLUSION
In concluding, I offer four suggestions or observations.
1. First, the book would have benefited from a more
definitive set of conclusions, and a more detailed analysis of
the criteria by which factual consent becomes legal consent.
As I concluded reading the book's complex and
intricate arguments, I came away feeling that the critical
focus was a bit too relentless. Not that it is easy to criticize;
actually, Westen shows how difficult it is to articulate
precisely what is wrong with the statutory provisions and
academic arguments that he so thoughtfully and
persuasively dissects. But it would have been immensely
helpful if he had offered the reader a more specific model of
how the problems of consent and sexual relationships
should be analyzed. Perhaps in the future Westen could
suggest model statutory language to address the most
important issues that he analyzes here.80 As suggested
earlier, he might propose greater uniformity of usage, such
as eliminating "consent" from "factual consent" and calling
this "acquiescence" or something else instead."1 Or, at least,
he might suggest that legislators and courts explicitly use
both the terms "factually consents" and "legally consents." 2
Moreover, it would have been useful to spell out and
analyze more fully some of the policies and principles that
jurisdictions invoke in deciding which instances of factual
consent qualify as legally valid consent. For example,
Westen recognizes that legally valid consent requires, not
just that S prefers x to the available alternatives, but that
her choice of x is sufficiently "free." Saying "yes" to a
stranger with a gun in order to avoid serious injury is
hardly the same as saying "yes" to a partner in order to
avoid his disappointment. But Westen says relatively little
80. Westen does offer a model statutory provision to simplify the treatment of
imputed consent. See supra note 63.
81. Westen recognizes the option but does not pursue it (52).
82. Thus, Westen criticizes a Kansas rape statute for sometimes using the
term "consent" factually and other times legally (339); but the statute's meaning
would presumably be beyond doubt if it used the terms "factual" and "legal."
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about how jurisdictions should analyze the difference or
how they should identify the line between criminal and
noncriminal behavior.8 3
To be sure, Westen is interested in providing a
conceptual framework that jurisdictions with widely
varying normative views would find useful. Still, it would
have been beneficial to clarify why, for example, he endows
"factual consent" with such minimal content and leaves so
much of the controversial work to the freedom, knowledge,
and competence conditions that convert factual into legal
consent. It would also be helpful to understand why some
issues of competence and knowledge are treated as part of
factual consent, while others are part of legal consent.8
(Perhaps this is an effort to reflect the ordinary meaning of
"acquiescing" or "agreeing" to x, but I suspect it also derives
from Westen's desire to invest factual consent with only a
modicum of normative content.)
It would have been especially helpful if Westen had
taken some of the most significant normative controversies
about the proper scope of sexual assault law and explicitly
stated how they should be framed. For example, although
he addresses aspects of the "'No' means 'no' and "Only 'yes'
83. For example, consider this opaque statement: "[Legal consent] does
require a certain measure of freedom, namely, whatever freedom to reject sexual
intercourse the society believes a woman must possess if her choice of sexual
intercourse is to satisfy her legitimate interests.. ." (48).
84. Recall that some minimum conditions of competence and knowledge are
part of factual consent. But why not build all such conditions in at the stage of
legal consent, as he does with the condition of freedom? Alternatively, we could
proceed in three rather than two steps:
1. Define factual consent very narrowly, excluding all conditions of
competence, knowledge, and freedom.
2. Add all conditions of competence and knowledge required for legal consent.
3. Then add all conditions of freedom required for legal consent.
This approach would avoid the awkwardness of building an extremely minimal
competence requirement into factual consent (so that, under Westen's analysis,
even a three-year-old can factually consent) (see supra note 16). It would also
render irrelevant the ultimately pointless distinction between fraud in the factum
and in the inducement, which Westen rightly criticizes (197-99). We would not
need to identify what type of "knowledge of x" is required for factual consent, and
could instead focus on the genuine and ultimate issue, namely, what kinds of
knowledge about x and the surrounding circumstances (including the risks and
benefits of x) should be considered legally adequate for consent.
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means 'yes"' approaches numerous times in the book, his
analysis focuses on specific mistakes and fallacious
arguments that legislators and commentators make in
analyzing them, and not on how they should be
conceptualized.
Westen skirts many of the hard questions by simply
treating them as among the difficult normative questions
that the jurisdiction must decide in converting factual
consent into legal consent. Of course, in light of the
conceptual nature of his project, it is hardly an objection
that Westen declines to take a position on many of the most
difficult normative questions here. But there is much more
that could be said, of a conceptual nature, about the best
way to understand the translation of factual consent into
legal consent.
Perhaps Westen's hesitation stems from his belief that
legal consent is "contestable" in ways that factual consent
is not (330).15 But the contrast seems overstated. He has
shown that jurisdictions and commentators employ a great
diversity of approaches to both factual consent and to legal
consent. And if "contestable" means "cannot be rationally
analyzed," that seems an inapt description of both factual
consent and legal consent. Westen does articulate the
range of considerations that are typically found relevant to
legal consent.8 6 I hope that he, or other scholars, will in the
future subject these to more sustained analysis.
85. Westen further claims that factual consent is constant and invariable,
while legal consent adds variable elements (327). He seems to believe that
"factual consent to x" means the same thing regardless of which x we are talking
about; and regardless of the jurisdiction (328). But this, too, seems overstated.
Westen acknowledges a variety of approaches to whether "indifference" counts as
a form of factual consent, and about the requisite knowledge condition implicit in
factual consent. And presumably a state's normative views about the proper scope
of criminal liability could affect its definitions both of factual consent and of legal
consent.
More generally, Westen seems to believe that the normative questions
surrounding consent are less subject to analysis than are the conceptual
questions (108). Yet again, the contrast seems overdrawn. After all, even the
conceptual questions that arise in defining criteria of factual consent are
questions we ask in order to improve the ultimate legal and normative analysis.
86. Westen mentions vulnerability to exploitation, the harm that A will cause
S, the value of permitting self-regarding decisions, the social consequences and
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2. The possibility of an ideal or model statutory
approach raises a deeper question about Westen's project.
There is some tension in the book between (1) providing a
descriptive account of how ordinary people, and current
sexual assault statutes, use various concepts related to
consent (such as force, resistance, threat, compulsion,
freedom, knowledge, and choice) and (2) providing a more
idealized conceptualization of the normative phenomenon
of consent to sexual relations, using terms entirely as terms
of art, if necessary. We can see this tension in the basic
progressive structure of factual and legal consent:
1. No factual consent.
2. Factual consent but not legal consent.
3. Legal consent = factual consent under adequate
conditions of competence, knowledge, and freedom.
At times, Westen seems to suggest that the case for
finding legally valid consent becomes progressively
stronger as we move from step one to step two to step three
(which fills in all the necessary conditions for
"decriminalizing" what would otherwise be sexual
assault).87 At times, in other words, factual consent appears
to have some presumptive normative weight, relative to
cases in which factual consent is absent. But this claim is
too strong. To be sure, cases in which a conscious victim is
physically overpowered and cannot prevent that outcome
might ordinarily be considered a more serious infringement
of a woman's autonomy than cases in which she can make
some choice, no matter how constrained. But in many
instances of (1), where A acts without any factual consent,
A is much less culpable or commits a much lesser wrong
than in many instances of (2), where A does act with
effectiveness of criminalization, alternative ways to regulate A's conduct, and the
seriousness of the criminal penalty (121).
87. See, e.g., 52 (Canada's usage of factual consent is "a healthy reminder of
the normative significance of factual atttitudinal 'consent'"); 49 (contrasting a
case in which a victim is overpowered despite her resistance with a case in which
a victim is forced to acquiesce).
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factual consent. Intercourse secured by threat of death with
a woman who reluctantly gives factual consent can
certainly be understood as a worse wrong than intercourse
with a sleeping woman.
It appears, then, that Westen's framework is not a
series of increasingly weighty normative presumptions of
valid consent so much as a pragmatic instrument for
clarifying concepts and reorganizing the structure of
analysis. And throughout the book, Westen offers
numerous examples of ways in which his general
framework, and its particular subcategories, would indeed
avoid serious confusion. Still, there remains some tension
between the descriptive enterprise of identifying the
ordinary language or legislatively intended meaning of
terms such as consent, force, compulsion, and resistance,
and the more prescriptive and idealized enterprise of
developing concepts that perfectly suit a range of
normative objectives.
3. In this review, I have suggested a number of specific
problems with Westen's analysis, most importantly the
following:
* The terminology of factual "consent" creates
significant confusion, which Westen understates.
" The category of factual consent in which S is
"indifferent" to whether x occurs is somewhat
problematic, and involves only a weak sense of
choice.
* Indecision might legitimately count as a fourth
category of factual consent.
* The choice set over which factual consent ranges
should not include options of affirmative action that
the victim S could choose. Otherwise, we will be
presupposing a controversially stringent duty to
resist.
* The category of factual "expressive" consent should
be divided into two separate categories, factual




* The "expressive" consent category is too crude,
because it does not permit a jurisdiction to choose a
mens rea other than negligence with respect to S's
attitudinal consent.
* More generally, although a jurisdiction might indeed
wish to characterize "expressive" consent as
pertaining to mens rea, it also might have reason to
characterize "expressive" consent (or some variant of
"expressive" consent) as constitutive of the actus
reus.
" Westen's framework cannot readily explain two
significant contemporary approaches to non-
consent-the "'No' means 'no' and the "Only 'yes'
means 'yes' approaches-because it cannot easily
articulate and model a jurisdiction's decision to treat
a "no" or the lack of a "yes" as insufficient for legal
consent.
* The claim that retrospective consent essentially
dissolves the harm of sexual assault is unpersuasive.
For it is an open and normatively contestable
question whether we should always give priority to
what S today views as having been in her best
interests over what she viewed as in her interests in
the past.
* The so-called "fictions" of constructive, informed, and
hypothetical consent often do not deserve the label.
For although these categories do not involve persons
who consented to x in Westen's prescriptive sense,
they frequently involve scenarios in which S does
consent in a significant sense, either to a social
activity that includes x, or to the risk of x; or they
involve a subject who would have consented but did
not have the capacity to do so. These forms of consent
at the very least bear a family resemblance to
Westen's core category of prescriptive consent.
* Constructive consent to x involves S agreeing to a
package in which x is only one component; but
prescriptive consent also often involves merely
agreeing to a package in a similar sense.
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* Informed consent to a risk of x can be defined in
precisely parallel fashion to prescriptive consent to x
itself (incorporating the same criteria of factual and
legal consent, suitably modified).
* Westen's definitions of force and resistance, while
elegant, are procrustean: he presupposes that "force"
is just a term of art for all unlawful pressures that
induce S's acquiescence, and that "resistance" is
essentially a term of art for any option available to S
by which she could avoid both x and A's threat. These
very broad definitions are disconnected from the
history of the law of sexual assault and from the
normative controversies that these terms continue to
provoke.
* The argument that a jurisdiction's wrongful force
requirement entails, as a logical corollary, a duty to
resist is fallacious. A jurisdiction might have good
reason to prohibit wrongful threats only of a certain
type or degree of harm, but also good reason not to
impose an affirmative duty on a victim of an
immediate violent threat to resist even if she could
thereby avoid suffering the same type or degree of
harm.
4. The Logic of Consent is aptly named. This is a book
about logic, about concepts. Its point is analytical clarity,
not normative persuasion. The framework that Westen
offers is extraordinarily helpful in understanding consent
to sexual crimes. It should also prove highly useful in
examining other legal doctrines involving consent. Some of
these, Westen discusses only in passing (for example, the
right to refuse medical treatment, and informed consent in
the sense of a duty to disclose risks and benefits of S's
consenting to a procedure or physical contact). And the
analysis of doctrines and concepts outside of criminal law-
including assumption of risk in tort law, consent in
contract law, and perhaps consent in political theory-
should also benefit from his sophisticated framework."8
88. Westen touches on the latter at 285.
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Let me end with a caution to prospective readers. This
is a challenging book. The conceptual analysis is sometimes
abstract, and the architecture of the argument is elaborate.
Moreover, in an effort to be both meticulous and thorough,
Westen writes in a style that is sometimes dryly
methodical, even mechanical. (I wish he had more
frequently used shorthand phrases rather than replicating
criteria each time he reinvoked them.)
But the depth, subtlety, and originality of the analysis
will richly reward the patient reader. Legal philosophers,
legal academics, judges, and legislators alike will profit
from this splendid book. And if the lessons that Westen
teaches are taken to heart in revising criminal law
legislation and doctrine, then ordinary citizens will benefit
as well. Conceptual precision can avoid confusion and
facilitate the accurate expression of underlying principles.
Enormous normative and factual disagreements will
persist, of course. But we are certainly better off if we know
precisely what we are disagreeing about.
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